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Introduction 
After gaining the independence in 1991, along with the legacy of historic, cultural, ethnic, and 
linguistic differences among regions, Ukraine inherited unfinished process of nation and 
identity building. Throughout the history, the inhabitants of the Eastern regions had more 
experience of living under the Russian flag, of speaking Russian as the only means of 
communication and sharing Russian culture and historical narrative. Unlike the Western 
regions, the East had no tradition of Ukrainian nationalist movement, did not praised the 
Ukrainian language as the core of Ukrainian identity, and had never experienced the influence 
of any other foreign cultures apart from Russian. While the Western Ukrainians exalted the 
heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which got support from Nazi Germany in their 
struggle for independence and against the communist regime, the Eastern Ukrainians shared 
with Russia the narrative of the united army of Soviet citizens protecting their Motherland.  
The status quo between the two identities destabilized in 2014. A peaceful protest against 
the unfavorable regime ended up with mass riots followed with the ouster of the president. 
Russia took the opportunity to involve into the internal affairs of the unstable state and 
regained Crimea, the territory they believed to be lost due to a historical mistake. Moreover, 
the Eastern regions of Donetsk and Lugansk were supported in their struggle for 
independence, which has led to the escalation of the military conflict in weakened Ukraine. 
The new Ukrainian government, which gained a vast support of the population, has chosen a 
new nationalization course. Although this course is believed to have united the citizens 
against the common enemy, the discrepancy between the two identities has grown. While 
the most part of the population developed their identity on the basis of the Western national 
symbols, culture and the Ukrainian language in the core, the other part has suffered greater 
alienation from the mainstream discourse. The Russian language, culture, and identity have 
become closely bound with authoritarianism, the Soviet past, and the aggressor country.   
At the same time, Russia has started to promote their view of the impoverished Eastern-
Ukrainian identity. The new discourse of the Russian world developed in Kremlin brought up 
the new interpretation to the identity agenda. It was claimed that the citizens of now 
independent states of Russian and Ukraine shared common traditions, mentality, history and 
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culture. Inside Russia and in the areas of Eastern Ukraine where Russian television became 
dominant, the Kremlin’s political technologists have managed to construct an alternative 
reality, where the new Ukrainian government is depicted as nationalist and the ethnic 
Russians in Ukraine are oppressed and endangered.  
As result, we have the same two identities in Ukraine, but instead of peaceful coexistence, 
they became the representations of two antagonistic societies at war. Same historical events 
and personalities are presented in conflicting ways, leading to construction of inconsistency 
and escalation of hate. Russia continues to challenge the vague boundary between Russian 
and Ukrainian identities, undermining the basic right of the Ukrainian nation and state to 
existence, while the new official discourse of the Ukrainian government is aimed at alienating 
the Ukrainian identity from Russia in order to distinguish its uniqueness and independence. 
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine serves as a vivid example of how the state acts as one of the 
most influential agents of external identification. At this point it is crucial to note that even 
the state does not monopolize the production identity. Such inevitable parts of identity as 
national symbols, historical narratives and language are the objects of mental 
representations, and thus they can be contested and deconstructed. If the struggle over 
identity has become a natural part of a conflict, the violence can be stopped in the realm of 
narratives and interpretations.  
There are different points of view even to how this conflict can be defined. The official 
Ukrainian position claims that it is either undeclared war with Russia, or the war against 
separatists and terrorists in the Eastern regions. The alternative approach defines the conflict 
as a civil war. Given the proofs of direct Russian military involvement, and, at the same time, 
the fact that the conflict is taking place on Ukrainian territory with Ukrainian citizens (or 
former Ukrainian citizens belonging to the new unrecognized republics – it is the matter of 
political preferences, and I am not taking either side in this research), I hereafter will address 
this conflict as Ukraine-Russia conflict. However, by this definition I do not mean a war 
between Ukraine and Russia, as it has more features of a civil war than a war between two 
states, but the decisive role of Russia in generating the conflict is beyond question. Thus, by 
calling it a Ukraine-Russia conflict, I primarily mean the clash between the two states in the 
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realm of constructing and interpreting the Ukrainian identity and building conflicting 
narratives, and not the military confrontation. 
At this point I argue that the violence in Ukraine-Russia conflict is produced by the 
antagonistic narratives about identity, history and the present. Hence, I believe the conflict 
transformation framework can be the most appropriate approach to stop the violence. The 
possibility for antagonistic societies to express and hear alternative narratives without fueling 
violence is a prerequisite for sustainable peace. Conflict transformation provides such 
possibility through dialogue.  
Within the framework of conflict transformation, dialogue is mainly aimed at “deconstruction 
of enemy images and narrative and construction of shared meanings and narratives.” 
Dialogue is the necessary link from antagonism to agonism. Using dialogue in peace-making 
process is unique inherent part of conflict transformation and reconciliation, which abstract 
it from other conflict resolution practices. When dialogue is understood as an act of sharing, 
it contributes to changing the vision of the other as the enemy, building enduring structures, 
where different societies are able to coexist peacefully. However, it is crucial that dialogue as 
part of conflict transformation process is not focused on studying identity itself, but it should 
look at identification. Researching the processes of perception and categorization should be 
the core element of peaceful dialogue. The shift from identities to identification, from 
narratives to their construction and execution, from those who carry identity to those who 
cultivate it must be in the center of conflict transformation.  
Simple discussion and exchange of views can result in deeper understanding of antagonist 
picture of the world and enriching views of the matter that is initially in controversy. The aim 
of dialogue is not to find who is right and who is wrong or whose interpretation of the truth 
has more right to exist, but to overcome misunderstanding, a failure of communication, a 
clash of values, and a collision of equally valid interests. The aim is to discover that 
interpretations, goals and directions might be different, but equally essential and valuable. 
Given that both sides of the Ukraine-Russia conflict represent aggressive antagonistic 
narratives and actively use historical myths and propaganda to promote these narratives, the 
whole notion of the truth disappears in the often-contradictory media reports from both 
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warring parties, while the observers, not having the direct access to the battleground, can 
only repeat and multiply the information provided by the propaganda machines. A possible 
facilitation of the situation could be achieved through the direct grassroots dialogue between 
the warring societies. Thus, the main research question of this work is how can the dialogue 
at the grassroots level contribute to the transformation of identity-based conflict in Ukraine?  
The answer can be found in a case-study of the video exchange between Ukrainian and 
Russian students in winter of 2015. The analysis will be aimed at exploring what language and 
terminology the speakers use, what symbols and myths they refer to, and, hence, what 
identity they represent. In case of the video messages, released by the Russian students, the 
question of identity does not matter. The research will be focused on the identity represented 
by the Western Ukrainian students, and by their colleagues from Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. 
The main question for the Western videos is whether they represent the official political 
discourse of their state, or are there signs of their disagreement with their government and 
expression of their personal point of view. For the Eastern videos it is interesting to see what 
identity they represent. Is it the so-called Eastern-Ukrainian identity, the Russian identity, or 
something different and distinctive? For Crimean videos the main question is if there are any 
signs of any type of Ukrainian identity represented, or do the speakers identify themselves 
only as Russians. As it is hardly possible to track how the exchange of video messages has 
contributed to the participants’ perception of each other, and how their self-identification 
has transformed through expressing their own opinions and listening to alternative ones, the 
main focus will be put on what potential such dialogue can have in conflict transformation. 
The work consists of three major parts. The first part includes the introduction into the 
identity studies and the representation of the identity situation in Ukraine, its historical 
retrospective and recent developments after 2014. The second part includes the introduction 
into the conflict transformation and dialogue discourse, highlighting the importance of the 
grassroots dialogue in the Ukraine-Russia conflict transformation. The third part forms the 
case study of the attempt undertaken by Ukrainian and Russian students to build a direct 
dialogue using the exchange of video messages on Youtube. 
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1. Identity 
1.1. Introduction into Identity studies 
1.1.1. Identity and identification 
Although the term “identity” is widely used in contemporary politics practices, application of 
this term in research must avoid treating it as a concept, which all people have, seek, 
construct, and negotiate. In general, identity can be understood from two different 
perspectives: as a category of practice and as a category of analysis. From practical angle, “it 
is used by “lay” actors in some everyday settings to make sense of themselves, of their 
activities, of what they share with, and how they differ from, others. It is also used by political 
entrepreneurs to persuade people to understand themselves, their interests, and their 
predicaments in a certain way, to persuade certain people that they are (for certain purposes) 
“identical” with one another and at the same time different from others, and to organize and 
justify collective action along certain lines.”1 The researchers in identity studies should not 
take the existence of identity for granted, but focus on critical analysis of “the processes and 
mechanisms through which what has been called the «political fiction» of «identity» can 
crystallize, at certain moments, as a powerful, compelling reality.”2  
There are several approaches to understanding identity. First, if identity is understood as a 
basis of social or political action, it is often put in opposition to interest. It is hence used to 
shift the motivation of certain actions and decisions from simple self-interest to 
comprehensive self-understandings. Second, if identity is approached through the prism of 
collective phenomenon, it “denotes a fundamental and consequential sameness among 
members of a group or category. This may be understood objectively (as a sameness «in 
itself») or subjectively (as an experienced, felt, or perceived sameness). This sameness is 
expected to manifest itself in solidarity, in shared dispositions or consciousness, or in 
collective action.”3 The third approach comes from studying identity as a core of individual or 
collective self-understanding. Here it acts as a natural part of social being coming from 
                                                     
1 Brubaker, Cooper, 2000, p.5. 
2 ibid, p.5. 
3 ibid, p.7. 
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“something allegedly deep, basic, abiding, or foundational” and is expected to be “valued, 
cultivated, supported, recognized, and preserved.”4 This list of understandings is not 
excessive, as it can also include, for instance, identity as “a product of social or political 
action”, or as “the evanescent product of multiple and competing discourses” and other 
approaches introduced by Brubaker.5  
Along with such notions as ethnic, national or racial groups, the tendency to reify identity can 
be put in the field that Brubaker named as groupism. He suggests applying this term to all the 
processes aimed at representing different groups as something self-evidently existing and 
using them as given in social, cultural and political discourses. Thus, in order to avoid this 
tendency of groupism, identity-based conflicts should not be understood as conflicts between 
groups with different identities. The research on such phenomena as ethnicity, race, nation, 
or identity must be done through analysis of the contiguous notions, i.e. “practical categories, 
cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional 
forms, political projects and contingent events.”6 This also includes the analysis of the 
“processes through which [categories] become institutionalized and entrenched in 
administrative routines”7 and “embedded in culturally powerful and symbolically resonant 
myths, memories and narratives.”8  
Struggle over labelling, interpreting and explaining different events and parties is an 
inevitable integral part of modern violent conflicts. Such “conflict[s] over the nature of the 
conflict”9 can play a key role in production of violence and have important impacts. Identity 
framing in this sense is often used by warring parties as a tool of justification and 
legitimization of their decisions. The official institutionalization of national identity does not 
represent the perception or self-understanding of people upon whom these categories are 
imposed. However, it introduces a legitimate cause to be used in official representation of 
social reality, framing of political claims, and organization of political actions. 
                                                     
4 Brubaker, Cooper, 2000, p.7. 
5 ibid, p.8. 
6 Brubaker, 2002, p.167. 
7 Tilly, 1998, as quoted in Brubaker, 2002, p.169. 
8 Armstrong, 1982, as quoted in Brubaker, 2002, p.169. 
9 Horowitz, 1991, as quoted in Brubaker, 2002, p.174. 
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Making the research on identity, it is crucial to understand that it “exists only in and through 
our perceptions, interpretations, representations, categorizations and identifications. They 
are not things in the world, but perspectives on the world. These include ethnicized ways of 
seeing (and ignoring), of construing (and misconstruing), of inferring (and misinferring), of 
remembering (and forgetting).”10  
In order to separate the practical aspects of identity and treat it as a category of analysis, 
Brubaker suggests finding a substitute, which will exclude the whole lot of meanings 
accumulated around identity. As one of the possible substitutes he introduces the term 
“identification”.11 This term will drop all the other connotations inherent to identity and will 
mean the process in which a person or a group of people are on their way to characterize 
themselves, to find the difference from other groups, and to define the role in a narrative. 
However, in this context there still must be a distinction between self-identification and 
external identification. As the former aspect relates more to the field of sociology and 
psychology, it is the latter form of identification that is of particular interest for this research, 
as it includes formalized, codified, objectified systems of categorization developed by 
powerful, authoritative institutions, which cannot be found in self-identification.  
The state acts as one of the most influential agents of external identification. According to 
Bourdieu, “the state monopolizes, or seeks to monopolize, not only legitimate physical force 
but also legitimate symbolic force.”12 Although these ideas were expressed by many post-
modernism researchers, the contemporary identity-based conflicts make them evident. Using 
the conflict itself as a framework, the states use their authority to impose the categories and 
identities, framing them in official structures and legal acts, and making them unavoidable 
part of media, bureaucracy and society. However, it is crucial to note at this point that “even 
the most powerful state does not monopolize the production and diffusion of identifications 
and categories; and those that it does produce may be contested.”13  
Speaking of identity, it is important to keep in mind that in social practice the inevitable parts 
of identity, including language, dialect and accent, are the object of mental representations. 
                                                     
10 Brubaker, 2002, p.175. 
11 Brubaker, Cooper, 2000, p.1. 
12 Bourdieu, 1991, as quoted in Brubaker, Cooper, 2000, p.15. 
13 Brubaker, Cooper, 2000, p.16. 
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They belong to the realm of perception and appreciation, of cognition and recognition, where 
different involved parties invest their interests and their presuppositions, and of objectified 
representations in things or acts. Here, in this realm, they apply various self-interested 
strategies of symbolic manipulation, which are mostly aimed at determining the 
representation that other people may form of these properties and their bearers. 
Struggles over identity, and specifically over such attributes of identity as place of origin and 
language, are part of different struggles over classifications, and basically over “the monopoly 
of the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose 
the legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world and, thereby, to make and unmake 
groups.”14 Possessing such power to impose vision of the social world through principles of 
division establishes “meaning and a consensus about meaning”, and, thus, it creates “the 
reality of the unity and the identity of the group.”15  
We experience ourselves as if these things had a concrete existence in the world, but they are 
all brought into being through language.16 There is “nothing outside the text” and facts, truth, 
and reality are always only reference to alternative versions of events constructed for 
particular purposes through language. Staying in line with social constructionism theorists, it 
is crucial to remember that the truth does not exist in reality. There are only numerous 
constructions of the world, thus, references to the truth and facts are only references to the 
notions based on personal interpretations generated by culturally and historically specific 
factors.17 The application of language in this sense is the field where material objects and 
social formations obtain meaning and where the competing versions of reality are 
constructed in the service of interest and power. 
1.1.2. Identity-based conflicts 
In all modern wars and particularly in identity-based conflicts the struggle over vocal 
representation of the events and participants is as significant as direct military actions. 
Although the most visible and vivid forms of so-called “information war” are expressed 
                                                     
14 Bourdieu, 1991, p.223. 
15 ibid, p.223. 
16 Burr, 2006, as quoted in Ramsbotham, 2010, p.27. 
17 ibid, p.28. 
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through active propaganda and media control, the hidden parts of it, or what Ramsbotham 
called “radical disagreements”, are in the deep underground basis of such conflicts.18 Indeed, 
clashes of perspective and conflicts of belief probably play the most important part and must 
be researched carefully.  
The actions over interpretations of events and information has become a natural part of 
modern warfare. The victory and defeat is not defined anymore by territories and resources 
gained as result of the military success, but by success to convince everybody in the 
constructed “truth”. Thus, the violence must be stopped in the realm of words and 
definitions. John Vasquez notes that “because war was invented, it can be disinvented by 
people.”19 
The competition of mutually exclusive goods does not play a significant role in generating and 
nourishing violence in identity-based conflicts. The (re)production of identities is often 
expressed through myths and memories constructing the images of enemy and threat is a 
decisive driver of violence.  
During the conflict the group identity is constructed through repetition of narratives about 
negative events and actions setting the “enemy” identity in opposition. Such narratives 
become a new reality for the participants of the discourse. A joint identity of “victims of war” 
builds the boundary between “us” and “them”, making conflict resolution hardly possible and 
opening the space for future violence. Thus, even in case if the efforts to stop military actions 
and direct violence were successful, the possibility to reproduce antagonistic relations due to 
unsolved identity issues constructed within the conflict discourse puts these issues to the 
highest priority in conflict resolution.20  
Even if the violence in general has come to an end due to effective actions from international 
community, decisive initiatives from antagonistic parties, or just because a conflict shifts to a 
frozen confrontation stage, the careful treatment of identity issues is required in order to 
prevent a new outbreak. Chris Coker argues “that wars ... only really end when they are 
                                                     
18 Ramsbotham, 2010, p.8. 
19 Vasquez, 1994, as quoted in Buckley-Zistel, 2006, p.30. 
20 Buckley-Zistel, 2006, p.10. 
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transcended, when they ... [go] beyond the traditional currency of victory and defeat; when 
the defeated side ... [accepts] that the victory of its enemy ... [is] also its victory as well.”21  
Reduction of violence does not mean the end of a violent conflict. Post-conflict societies 
inevitably face new challenges arising from unsolved identity issues. After violent actions 
stop, “the experience of hardship and pain is deeply inscribed in the memory of individuals 
and groups and perpetuated through the stories people narrate about the event, keeping the 
dichotomies us/them or friend/enemy alive and obstructing paths to a peaceful future.”22 
The real results of conflict resolution are determined by the way how (former) enemies relate 
to each other and how they refer to the shared violent experience in a long-term perspective. 
“It is here where the parties to the conflict produce and reproduce their collective identities 
in either persistent antagonism or mutual acceptance.”23  
1.2. Identity in Ukraine 
1.2.1. Two Identities 
On the territories of former Soviet republics, including Ukraine, the notions of identity and 
nation were institutionalized and legally predetermined by the place of birth. However, the 
official nationality did not reflect the real situation on the ground. The very distinction 
between “Russians” and “Ukrainians” was vague and, in certain cases, illusive. Taking into 
account the high rates of intermarriage and the fact that a significant part of Ukrainian 
population uses only or primarily the Russian language in everyday life, the officially assigned 
identity cannot be accepted as given.  
During the Soviet times the communist regime granted Ukrainian people with wider national 
identification, including promotion of Ukrainian as the state language. However, at the same 
time the Soviet government policy was aimed at construction of a common national identity 
in all regions.  The promotion of Soviet ideology was not limited with language practices, but 
also included control over material culture, for example over dwellings. The consecutive 
urbanization and industrialization reforms conducted by the Soviet government has resulted 
                                                     
21 Buckley-Zistel, 2006, p.115. 
22 Ibid, p.85. 
23 Ibid, pp.115-116. 
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in construction of a socialist image of accommodation and uniform daily routines present all 
across the Union, thus contributing to dissolution of differences among major nations and 
regions.24 Therefore, the increase of application of Russian in communication, as well as 
strengthening of centralized governance, contributed to vanishing of the link between 
language, region and identity.  
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union all ethnic groups in Ukraine were granted equal 
political and social rights. Although the new official symbols and values were established 
based on those shared by the titular nation, the newly created Ukrainian nationhood included 
all citizens regardless of their origin and language preferences. The ongoing polemic about 
the status of the Ukrainian language lasted for the first two decades of the Ukrainian 
independence. All the governments throughout this period maintained a compromise 
position, giving Ukrainian the exclusive status of the titular language, while Russian prevailed 
in communicative practice. “However, Ukraine was not perceived as a nation with two 
languages. While Russian was respected as the language of a large part of the population and 
recognized as an accustomed communicative means within the country and beyond, 
Ukrainian was valued not only for its communicative functions but also for its symbolic role 
as the national language.”25  
Independent Ukraine inherited an unfinished process of nation building complicated by 
historic, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic differences between regions. Regional loyalties 
continue to dominate over loyalty to a single national identity. The absence of a concept of 
nationhood and of a shared national idea accepted by the whole population has led to a 
controversial and often ambivalent process of national identity formation. This has left the 
Ukrainian people without clear internal and external social boundaries and a shared meaning 
of the nation.26 
Although it is deemed that the Ukrainian speaking part of the population are the major 
bearers of the national cultural legacy comparing to the Russian speakers in Ukraine, it is 
                                                     
24 Seliverstova, 2017, p.67. 
25 Kulyk, 2016a, p.98. 
26 Korostelina, 2015, p.224. 
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crucial to note that both groups relate themselves to the country and equally participate in 
construction of identity in Ukraine.  
Ukraine has often been described as split between two competing “identity complexes”.27 
The legacy of Ukrainian lands belonging to different polities, and pronounced regional 
divisions in the ethnic make-up, language use and religious affiliation created fertile ground 
for identity contestation. In the late 2000s, self-reported ethnic Ukrainians constituted 77.8% 
of Ukraine’s population, while ethnic Russians accounted for 17.3%. The use of Russian, 
however, extended far beyond the Russian minority. According to a 2008 survey, 35% of 
respondents spoke Russian at home compared to 43% who spoke Ukrainian. Moreover, 
further 20% admitted that they used both languages.28 With most ethnic Russians and Russian 
speakers living in the southeast, identity contestation had a significant regional dimension. 
Shulman, for example, differentiates between an ‘Eastern Slavic identity complex’, based on 
identification with Russia, and an ‘ethnic Ukrainian identity complex’, based on distancing 
from Russia and identification with Europe.29  
It is interesting that the differences in identity are also reflected in the identity studies in 
Ukraine. For example, Ukrainian political and ethnic researcher from the Western part of 
Ukraine Mykola Riabchuk reflects in his studies the dominant discourse in contemporary 
Ukraine based on the traditional ideas of the Western nationalists. He argues that the border 
between two Ukrainian identities can be found not in the realm of territory, language, culture 
or ethnicity, but in the realm of political preferences. He sees the residents of most part of 
Ukraine with the core in the Western regions as the nation with experience of living in 
relatively liberal society with demand for respect of human rights, good governance and 
development, while the Eastern regions are seen as a traditional society with obsolete 
practices, which have been widely used when Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, and which 
have not significantly changed, but evolved in some obscure mechanisms and supported by 
Russia. Thus, the differences in ethnicity, language or in the ways the past is remembered and 
represented are considered less important than the shared system of values contributing to 
                                                     
27 Shulman, 2004, p.36. 
28 Feklyunina, 2015, p.15. 
29 Shulman, 2004., p.36. 
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the vision of future development. Hence, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is taking 
place in the realm of axiology.30 
All other factors, such as ethnicity, language, region, income, education, or age, correlate to 
a different degree with one of them. During the elections, statistical data implicates that 
neither ethnicity nor language of the hypothetical candidate noticeably influence voting 
patterns, it is the stated political priorities that influence the voters’ choice very strongly. 
Although there are statistical data that the division between too identities has some 
geographical analogue, the regression analysis allegedly shows that the value-based and 
identity driven divide between the Soviet and Pro-European identities correlates much less 
with ethnicity and language of the respondents and much more with their education and 
age.31 
Some pro-Western Ukrainian researchers argue that the Ukrainian language, culture, and 
identity have become closely bound with democracy and the West, whilst Russian language, 
culture, and identity have become closely bound with authoritarianism and the Soviet past, 
so struggle for or against Ukrainian identity means struggle for or against democracy. “It is a 
fault line, where on one side stands a host of emerging and assertive identities on the other 
side are found those clinging to a post-Soviet identity, one characterized by political passivity 
and a reliance on state paternalism. Those in Ukraine who opt for "Europe" simply want to 
put an end to ugly post-Soviet practices (such as rapacious crony capitalism, corruption, 
nepotism, selective application of justice, etc.) and foster the rule of law, secure property 
rights, and protection of human dignity - the values they associate, correctly, with Europe.”32  
1.2.2. Recent developments 
The events on Euromaidan in 2014 that led to the changes in power and the aggressive 
interference of Russia have destabilized the status quo in identity building processes in 
Ukraine. Both information war launched by Russia and the intensive reforms in major spheres 
related to identity initiated by the new Ukrainian government have contributed to significant 
shift in the identity issues in Ukraine. Thus, numerous attempts to construct the new 
                                                     
30 Torbakov, 2014, as quoted in Riabchuk, 2015, p.149. 
31 Riabchuk, 2015, p.149. 
32 Ibid, p.150. 
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identities can be traced since 2014 in Ukraine. Both conflicting parties use various tools in 
order to promote newly invented aggressive narratives. Same historical events and 
personalities are presented in conflicting ways, leading to construction of inconsistency and 
antagonism between the two societies. Russia seeks to challenge the previously vague and 
flexible boundary between Russian and Ukrainian identities, undermining the basic right of 
the Ukrainian nation and state to existence, while the new official discourse of the Ukrainian 
government is aimed at alienating the Ukrainian identity from Russia in order to distinguish 
its uniqueness and independence.  
Identity is constructed through different cultural and instrumental state initiatives, and is “the 
result of open-ended processes that give space to actors pursuing their specific political 
projects”. Although the monopoly of the state in identity construction is widely questioned, 
the role of the state authorities in this process is still extremely important. “By articulating a 
particular variant of an identity narrative, the state mobilizes some structures while at the 
same time potentially weakening others. It signals to elites and public in other states about 
the interests that guide its foreign policy.”33 
The events of 2014 and further nationalization course of the Ukrainian government has 
contributed to the growth of discrepancy between two Ukrainian identities. While one part 
of the population has shown the increase in “self-identification as Ukrainian, greater pride in 
being a citizen of the Ukrainian state, stronger attachment to symbols of nationhood, 
enhanced solidarity with compatriots, increased readiness to defend Ukraine or work for 
Ukraine, and increased confidence in the people’s power to change the country for the 
better”34, the other part has suffered greater alienation from the mainstream discourse. The 
increase of enmity towards Russia in general, and towards people allegedly supporting the 
“aggressor state” undermined their adherence to the Ukrainian state and their security. 
For example, while most Ukrainian nationalists supported promotion of such national 
symbols as Ukrainian flag, its coat of arms and traditional clothing, the interpretation of these 
symbols significantly differed for the Russian speakers. The presence of different shapes and 
sizes of the Ukrainian national flag in car interiors, as a ribbon or a pin attached to someone’s 
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bag or coat, or a big flag hung on the balcony was not only an expression of empathy and 
patriotic feelings, but also a marker of political preferences and engagement in the political 
life of Ukraine. Thus, not having any visible national Ukrainian symbols could be seen as 
suspicious and interpreted as indifference, or in the worst case, as affiliation with anti-
Ukrainian movement. For Russian speakers in the Western part of Ukraine, wearing Ukrainian 
national symbols was primarily for security reasons, not because of their ideological 
preferences. Although they were not indifferent to the events happening in Ukraine at the 
time, their reasons to expose national symbols were motivated with the desire not to be 
perceived negatively in the city.35  
Another example could be the changes in attitudes towards traditional clothing in Ukraine. 
The annual celebration of “Vyshyvanka day” was launched by Ukrainian student Lesya 
Voronyuk in 2007 and later has resulted in the official nationwide festivity proposed and 
adopted by the Ukrainian government in 2014. The official promotion of the vyshyvanka 
contributed to its becoming a mainstream attribute of Ukrainian patriots. However, many 
Russian speakers who supported it as part of Ukrainian culture before 2014, changed their 
attitude to the symbol. They claim that vyshyvanka has lost its patriotic meaning and has 
become a popular trend used for the purpose of avoidance to be an outsider in society.36  
Another example can be noticed in attitude towards products of Russian origin. After the 
initiative of Lviv activists to limit the consumption of Russian food products in March 2014, 
just in six month the Ukrainian government adopted the law to mark all the products made 
in Russia with visible signs of Russian flag. According to the Internet research done by TNS16 
in September 2014, 46% of Ukrainians were boycotting Russian products “expressing 
patriotism and feelings toward their country.”37 As a result, the import of Russian products 
was restricted on the national legislation level. However, many Russian speakers including 
those living in the Western Ukraine expressed their negative attitude to such initiatives and 
refused to participate in the boycott. 
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Although the language card has been often played by Ukrainian politicians throughout the 
whole period of independence, after President Yanukovych was ousted from power the newly 
established government secured both the article of the Constitution which mandates 
Ukrainian as the sole state language and the 2012 language law recognizing the regional 
status of Russian. Thus, the “language matters lost the prominent place that they had 
occupied in their legislative initiatives and public statements.”38 
Apart from being the preferable language for business, Russian is considered more profitable 
by most media producers in Ukraine. “Not only could products in that language be bought 
and sold on both the Ukrainian and Russian markets, but also within Ukraine they had the 
advantage of being preferred by the more affluent urban audiences and, therefore, by 
advertisers catering primarily to these audiences.”39  
However, as response to Russian annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbas, the 
Ukrainian government suspended and later banned broadcasting of several Russian television 
channels as the sources of information “flagrantly distorting the situation in Ukraine” in favor 
of the “aggressor country”. Moreover, the ban also expanded to the broadcast of Russian or 
Russian-oriented products on Ukrainian channels. The list included media products that 
“glorified present or past deeds of the Russian military”, as well as the products featuring 
actors or singers “who supported Russia’s policy with regard to the Crimea and Donbas, either 
in public statements or by performing in the occupied territories.”40 
In 2015 the Ministry of Culture initiated the law introducing 50% quota of national content, 
of which three-quarters was to be in Ukrainian. Even though many representatives of media 
in Ukraine have argued that such interference contradicted the democratic principles, which 
the government was always allegedly supported, and that there is a lack of high-quality media 
content in Ukrainian, the law came into power in 2016.41 
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However, despite the increase in symbolic significance of the Ukrainian language, it was not 
followed with the growth of its communicative role. Most Russian speakers did not correlate 
their belonging to the Ukrainian nation with their language.  
The transformation of education system has played a significant role in development and 
transformation of national identity. It is argued that the language of instruction usually 
reflects the cultural and political preferences of the teacher and is often used in transmitting 
the official historical and national narratives in contemporary Ukraine. The changes in political 
discourse shows its close correlation with transformation of educational system. For instance, 
during the period of Yanukovych presidency in 2010-2014 the Ministry of Education 
attempted to secure the increase of courses taught in Russian at schools. On the contrary, the 
newly established government after the Euromaidan contributed to complete Ukrainization 
of educational system in the country.42  
Such reforms were primarily aimed at constructing the idea that the Ukrainian language is 
threatened by the Russian influence. At the state level, it is argued that the titular language 
is the prerequisite for Ukrainian independence and sovereignty, while promotion of Russian 
is presented as the core threat to the development of the Ukrainian nation. In practice, this 
new direction was followed by the series of laws developed by the Ukrainian parliament, 
which were aimed at “protecting the public status of the Ukrainian language, societal 
integration and strengthening the state and territorial unity of Ukraine.”43 Moreover, it was 
proposed to establish system of punishment for those whose command of Ukrainian is not 
sufficient.   
In general, the Ukrainian language is understood as the core of national identity and is put 
into opposition to the influence of Russia. Thus, the official political discourse in Ukraine 
“tends to depict Russian as a “backward”, “imperial remnant” of the Soviet Union”, while 
Ukrainian is considered to be “not only a key marker of national identity and a means of 
political independence, but also a chance for better “European prospects” and the clear sign 
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of Ukrainian Europeanness.”44 Thus, protection of the Ukrainian language as the only state 
language is constructed as an inevitable part of the nation-building process.  
However, the attitudes towards the official discourses were not the same in different regions 
even before the latest changes of power.  The easiest way to trace these attitudes is through 
analyzing how history is taught in schools. It is clear that schoolteachers play a significant role 
in constructing national identity through formation of opinion among their students. Even if 
specific historical events or figures are studied from different perspectives, the opinion of the 
teacher will have a predominant role and will critically influence the opinions of students. 
According to the research conducted by Karina Korostelina in 2013, which included interviews 
with 60 teachers from three distinct regions in Ukraine (Crimea, Lviv and Kiev), the official 
history textbooks play a secondary role in the history classes. All the teachers admitted they 
altered the information given in the textbooks by criticizing it, emphasizing its limitations, and 
even pointing out errors. Although all three groups criticized the textbooks for inadequate 
presentation of the nation and deficiencies in the approach to the formation of their personal 
concept of national identity, such alterations significantly varied in different regions.45  
The predominant opinion in the Western regions stated that “ethnic Ukrainians have more 
rights than any other group to define the meaning of national identity.”46 The Ukrainians living 
in the West are considered to be “more educated and culturally developed than Russians”47, 
and to have a higher moral quality and values comparing to the people in the East. The 
teachers argued that the foundation of Ukrainian national identity must be based on the 
culture and language of the Western Ukrainians. Ethnic minorities can be excluded from the 
nation-building process as unimportant. Thus, the teachers from these regions encourage to 
put a strong emphasis on Ukrainian ethnic culture as a foundation for the nation, and to 
present the history of Ukraine as a consistent fight for independence. 
Concerning the attitude towards Russia, these teachers juxtapose “victimized and peaceful 
Ukraine” and “aggressive Russia positing a constant threat to Ukraine.”48 As part of the 
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teaching process, they lift the facts depicting Russia as aggressive and imperialist, 
emphasizing the differences in culture, political orientation, and values between the two 
states. Regardless of admitting the plurality of opinions in different regions, these teachers 
argue that these differences can be excluded from the creation of the Ukrainian identity.  
The Western Ukrainians tend to justify the violence, which took place during the UPA struggle 
for independence, through equating Nazism with communism and the presenting Ukraine as 
a victim suffered from both regimes. They also tend to glorify the Ukrainian nationalists of 
that period justifying their atrocities as a reaction to victimization. The Soviet Army is 
described as an army of occupants, who fought for protection of the regime at the cost of the 
independence of Ukraine.  
The teachers from Crimea appealed to develop Ukrainian national identity on the principles 
of a multicultural state. They stressed that the promotion of the Ukrainian language and 
culture produces resistance among the local residents. They failed to see their region as part 
of the Ukrainian culture and history presented in the textbooks, and found it uninteresting to 
study both for themselves and for children. This group of teachers endorse a multicultural 
concept of national identity by condemning ethnic nationalism and a homogenous concept 
of national identity, and by emphasizing the multicultural nature of Ukraine and equal rights 
for all ethnic groups. In their teaching, they emphasize the narrowness and inadequacy of an 
ethnic national narrative and its exclusive and alien nature for many students and they 
promoted a vision of Ukraine as being comprised of different ethnic groups that contribute 
to the prosperity of the nation.49 
The teachers supported the negative attitude towards the actions of Mikhail Gorbachev that 
led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which is depicted in the history textbooks. They 
also expressed satisfaction with the fact that the importance of the Orange Revolution is 
removed from official educational program and pro-Ukrainian ideology is significantly 
reduced. However, they stress out that the role of the Russian ethnic group is not represented 
in Ukrainian history, while Russia is treated as an alien country. Thus, they confirm that they 
teach the history of Russia not as a history of a foreign state, but in a wider perspective that 
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includes many events affecting Ukraine. Thus, they attempt to “dissolve the boundary 
between the two states by teaching the common history, showing similarities between two 
nations and condemning Ukrainian ethnic nationalism.”50 
The teachers from Crimea also emphasized the contribution of the Soviet Union into 
unification and development of the Ukrainian state. While accepting the presence of both 
positive and negative aspects, they consider the Soviet time to be an inevitable part of the 
Ukrainian history. Thus, they teach the positive impacts of the Soviet regime for Ukraine, 
while laying responsibility for the current instability and economic crisis upon the Western 
nationalists. Moreover, they accuse the residents of the West of denying the achievements 
of Soviet Ukraine and of distorting the events of the World War II and undermining the role 
of the Soviet veterans in the war. The general negative perception of the Ukrainian Insurgent 
Army (UPA) emphasized throughout the study process includes the facts of their collaboration 
with the Nazis and crimes committed on the occupied territory of Ukraine.51  
The teachers from Kiev expressed the idea that the definition of a nation must be built on 
citizenship rather than ethnic culture. The state should be independent from ethnic identity. 
Thus, they promote the equality of all people of Ukraine omitting their ethnic or religious 
belonging. They claim that Ukraine should be a modern democratic state built around a 
political rather than an ethnic idea. They criticize ethnic nationalism and endorse democratic 
values. While presenting the events of the Soviet times, the teachers from Kiev choose to 
criticize both Ukrainian nationalism and Soviet totalitarianism without glorification of any 
particular side. In general, they try to emphasize mutual responsibilities of both sides for 
committed offenses by stressing how aggressive actions of each side derived from histories 
of intergroup relations, reciprocal wrongdoings, and misinterpretations.52 
It seems that this division of identities has contributed to the territorial divisions secured by 
the Russian annexation of Crimea and provocation of the civil war in Donbass. After 2014, 
Ukraine was able to incorporate the Western identity in its official discourse, while Crimea 
and Donbass found their support in Russia. 
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1.2.3. Russian information war 
In 1999, Igor Sergeev, then Russia’s minister of defense, admitted that Russia could not 
compete militarily with the West. Instead, he suggested searching for “revolutionary paths” 
and “asymmetrical directions”. Thus, the Russian military and intelligence theorists set the 
course to elaborate new ideas for non-physical warfare, claiming that Russia was already 
under attack by western NGOs and media.53  
Although the notion of information war came into Russia’s official discourse fairly recently, 
the early 2000s had already been marked by an outburst of image-building activities. Initially 
the attention was focused primarily on Western countries, where Moscow tried to project a 
narrative of Russia’s belonging to the greater European civilization and to emphasize its 
reliability as a business partner. The events in Ukraine in 2004 that later was called the Orange 
Revolution marked a crucial turning point. The transfer of authority to pro-Western President 
Yushchenko was seen in Moscow as a result of direct intervention of the US. In other words, 
there was an overwhelming sense in Kremlin that the developments triggered by the 
Ukrainian Maidan have challenged Russia's national interest in an unprecedented manner. 
Anticipating losing influence in the neighboring region, the Russian authorities started to 
develop new instruments of indirect interference. This change in the official discourse 
coincided with a rapid increase of a number and activity of various actors. “Some already 
existing actors, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation or the radio station 
‘Voice of Russia’ saw a substantial increase in their funding. A number of new organizations 
were created with either direct or indirect involvement of the Kremlin, including the Russian 
World Foundation, the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, and the English-
language TV channel ‘Russia Today’ (later rebranded as RT), with an Arabic and a Spanish-
language channels following suite.”54  
This policy was revised in early 2010s in order to stop further erosion of Moscow’s influence 
in the region. Such actors as the US, NATO and the EU were considered to interfere into 
Russia’s “sphere of privileged interests”. One of the newly proposed instruments became 
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Eurasian Union. Its success was seen as crucial for Russia’s global competitiveness. Besides 
economic advantages, it was seen as “a project for maintaining the identity of nations in the 
historical Eurasian space”. However, unlike Belarus and Kazakhstan, Ukraine was hardly eager 
to join the Customs Union with Russia. Thus, the Russian authorities viewed Ukraine as a 
missing link in Russia’s economic and military security.55  
In 2013, the head of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Valery 
Gerasimov claimed that it was now possible to defeat enemies through a “combination of 
political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns”.56 This was part of 
a new vision of war, which lay not in the realm of physical contact but in what Russian 
theorists described as the “psychosphere”. These wars of the future would be fought not on 
the battlefield but in the minds of people. 
This idea was later developed into the concept of “hybrid war”, where instead of or along 
with direct military involvement other asymmetric measures must be undertaken including 
“political, diplomatic, informational, economic, military, and other efforts”.57 A significant 
role in this new warfare was assigned to “information war”, which in Russian understanding 
was based on the principle of “reflexive control”. According to Timothy L Thomas, an analyst 
at the US army’s Foreign Military Studies Office and an expert in recent Russian military 
history and theory, reflexive control involves “conveying to an opponent specially prepared 
information to incline him voluntarily to make the predetermined decision desired by the 
initiator of the action”.58 In other words, to know your adversary’s behavior patterns so well 
you can provoke him into doing what you want. A manual issued for Russian military staff and 
students suggests that it is possible to question the primacy of objects in the real world and 
to “put information before objects”, thus reinventing the reality and spinning it in a favorable 
or unfavorable direction.59 
The transformation of Russia’s approach to weaponization of information can be traced in the 
transition of the Kremlin’s official international news channel Russia Today or currently RT 
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from a tool to introduce Russian vision of different events and its strategic goals into a 
comprehensive propaganda machine. According to the head of RT Margarita Simonyan, 
“there is no such thing as objective reporting”60.  Thus, the RT’s mission is to push the 
objectivity of facts to its breaking point. At the time when many in the west have lost faith in 
the integrity and authority of mainstream media organizations, RT seems to be dedicated to 
the proposition that after the notion of objectivity has evaporated all stories are equally true. 
If a commitment to the impossibility of objective reporting means that any position, however 
bizarre, is no better or worse than any other is, the ultimate effect, which may be the intended 
one, is to suggest that all media organizations are equally untrustworthy. This concept is 
quickly stretched to mean that any opinion has the same weight as others.  
Although the official reasoning of such activities was framed in the discourse of soft power, 
Moscow’s understanding of this discourse was fairly different from Nye’s conceptualization 
and more reminiscent of Soviet propaganda. According to Putin, soft power is “a set of 
instruments and methods used to achieve foreign policy goals without resorting to military 
means, but with the help of information and other instruments of influence.”61 The Russian 
authorities were particularly keen to utilize various projects promoting the Russian language, 
media, and the Orthodox Church in the post-Soviet countries. The efforts in these countries 
primarily targeted those “compatriots”, who were either born in the Soviet Union or had 
intensive cultural ties with Russia.  
Although the notion of the “Russian world” has been widely discussed among Russian 
researcher long before it was brought into official discourse, its key characteristics were 
defined during its active promotion after 2007 and especially after 2014. 
Besides ethnic affiliations, the official definition included the Russian language, the Orthodox 
Christianity and the Russian culture. The Russian World Foundation drew a more detailed 
picture, by including ‘millions of ethnic Russians, native Russian speakers, their families and 
descendants’, but also ‘the millions of people worldwide who have chosen the Russian 
language as their subject of study, those who have developed an appreciation for Russia and 
its rich cultural heritage’. Concerning territory, Russian world was not limited by any borders 
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and countries. However, in practice the main attention was paid to Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus as the countries with “strong bond of brotherhood” establishing the core of the 
Russian world.62 Moreover, the application of the Russian world concept to Ukraine was 
inconsistent as some agents included all Ukrainians regardless of their ethnic, linguistic or 
religious background; while the other narrowed it with include only Russian speakers or 
ethnic Russians residing in Ukraine.  
Another feature of the Russian world, which was widely discussed within the Russian political 
discourse, includes the interpretation of the common past. Initially it was claimed that now 
independent states of Russian and Ukraine were both descendants of Kievan Rus and thus 
their citizens shared “common traditions, a common mentality, a common history and a 
common culture.”63 Although Putin repeatedly argued that Russia had “no desire or 
aspiration to revive the Soviet empire”64 and thus was not aimed at challenging the 
sovereignty of the post-Soviet states, what was challenged is identity of those living in 
Ukraine. It was claimed that Russians and Ukrainians continued to be “one people” in terms 
of their shared past and shared culture, hence the current separation was regarded as 
abnormal. Although the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian culture, were described as one 
of many equal parts of the Russian world, Russia was regarded as the heart of the community 
thus constructing hierarchical relationship between Russia and other countries of the Russian 
world.  
The popular attitude towards the concept of the Russian world were unevenly distributed in 
different regions of Ukraine. According to the survey conducted by Kyiv-based Razumkov 
Centre in 2013, the overwhelming majority of respondents in Western Ukraine (78.3%) 
negatively interpreted promotion of the Russian world as an aggressive attempt to restore 
the Russian empire, while only 14.8% of respondents in the South and 28.6% in the East 
related it with empirical ambitions, while the majority viewed it positively: 59.5% of 
respondents in the East and 70.4% in the South believed that the “Russian world” was 
primarily aimed at development of “spiritual unity of the brotherly peoples”. However, there 
was a significant shift in opinions comparing to the data collected in 2010.  Thus, the share of 
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respondents across Ukraine who understood the Russian world as an attempt to “restore the 
Russian empire” increased from 30.4% in 2010 to 48.4% in 2013, while the share of those who 
saw it positively dropped from 56.8% in 2010 to 39.7% in 2013. The explanation of this shift 
can be found in deterioration of general attitude towards Russia caused by the series of crises 
in relationships between Moscow and the West, which were followed with increase of highly 
media coverage where Russia was depicted mostly negatively.65  
Inside Russia and in areas of Eastern Ukraine where Russian television is dominant, the 
Kremlin’s political technologists have managed to create a parallel reality where “fascists” 
have taken power in Kiev, ethnic Russians in Eastern Ukraine are in mortal danger and the CIA 
is waging a war against Moscow. The notion of Novorossiya can serve as an example of 
construction of a new reality. This term originated from tsarist Russia where it represented a 
different geographical space was introduced by the Russia’s authorities to the large wedge of 
South-Eastern Ukraine. Nobody who lives in that part of Ukraine has ever thought of 
themselves as living in Novorossiya and bearing allegiance to it. Now Novorossiya is 
constructed into existence: Russian media are showing maps of its “geography”, while its 
“history” is secured in official school textbooks.  
The aim of this new propaganda is not to convince or persuade, but to keep the viewer hooked 
and distracted, passive and paranoid, rather than agitated to action. The aim seems less to 
establish alternative truths than to spread confusion about the status of the truth. In a similar 
vein, the aim of the professional pro-Putin online trolls who haunt website comment sections 
is to make any constructive conversation impossible. Once the rational dialogue has been 
undermined, the side that tells better stories and does so more aggressively will edge out 
someone trying methodically to “prove” a fact. In this shape-shifting context, which endures 
today, all political philosophy becomes political technology, and the point of ideas and 
language are not what they represent, but what function they fulfill. The point of any 
statement is its effect rather than any notion of truth. 
This new information warfare is guided by a new vital dimension, namely the belief that 
whose story wins may be more important than whose army wins. Ivan Krastev and Stephen 
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Holmes argued that many Russians are perfectly aware that the news is faked. Thus, the 
media power is entrenched not by trying to persuade people that it is telling the truth, but by 
making it clear that it can dictate the terms of the “truth” and thus enhancing its influence.66  
1.2.4. Results 
According to Torbakov, what Euromaidan stands for is, primarily, a value-based vision of 
Ukraine as part of a wider Europe. It is adherence to a set of values born at the dawn of 
European modernity including rule of law, division between public and private spheres, 
human rights, freedom that could and should become a cornerstone of the overarching 
Ukrainian national identity.67  
What the current situation with two contested identities practically means for the country is 
that the identity split is undermining democratic transition of Ukraine, as well as its 
international position. The clash made not only possible, but also tempting, for local leaders 
to channel popular dissatisfaction with their poor social and economic performance at the 
ominous force from either “heavily demonized Galicia (inhabited by crazy nationalists and led 
by American pawns) or caricatured Donbas (inhabited by homo Sovieticus and controlled by 
local mafia and the Russian fifth column.”68 What in some other Eastern European countries 
with Soviet experience could be merely a struggle between two mediocre politicians, in 
Ukraine appeared to be suicidal infighting between “two bad candidates that benefited the 
third, profoundly anti-European and antidemocratic force” with vast support from the East.69  
Ukrainian identity, its development and transformation have always been at the core of 
Russia-Ukraine relations. Cultural proximity and long period of shared history have always 
played a significant role in making Ukraine central to Russia’s geopolitical interests. Both 
during the coexistence under the same flag, and especially after the end of the Soviet era, the 
uneasy relationship of two “Slavic brothers” has been evolving in the realm of mutual 
misperceptions, conflicting historical myths and contested identities. Instead of supporting 
the Soviet idea of Ukraine being a part of Russia’s geopolitical greatness, contemporary 
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Ukrainian government has developed its own historical narrative based on the history of 
freedom and resistance. “This is the crux of the matter: whereas Russia's grand story 
emphasizes togetherness, the Ukrainian one stresses separateness. No wonder the two have 
clashed.”70  
Before the political crisis in Ukraine, the inhabitants of the East have been sharing Russian 
official historical narrative. The East had no tradition of a Ukrainian nationalist movement, its 
population, unlike that of the West, has internalized Soviet identity and suppressed the 
collective trauma of the Holodomor. What especially divides the East and West, according to 
this discourse, is the respective collective memories of World War II and the irreconcilable 
narratives of heroism and suffering. Indeed, while western Ukraine honors the heroes of the 
UPA, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which fought for an independent Ukraine against both 
Hitler and Stalin, Eastern Ukraine shared with the Russia the heroic narrative of the Great 
Patriotic war. Arguably, until now most Russians and some segments of Ukraine's population 
(which includes 11 million ethnic Russians) have not seen the difference between the two 
Slavic peoples and, consequently, have not understood the raison d'etre of a separate 
Ukrainian state.71 
The Russian aggression catalyzed the creation of a political nation. Ukrainian identity, which 
for so long had been associated with ethnicity, language and historical memory, suddenly has 
become territorial, political, and thus inclusive. Even for the Russian-speaking urban middle 
class, along with small and medium-sized business owners and the intellectual elites in the 
East of Ukraine, Russia’s antidemocratic tendencies, its self-isolation and growing hostility to 
the West made it easier to become a part of Ukrainian national identity, based on the 
European values. The Russian interference, paradoxically, not only polarized the Russophone 
group but also consolidated the major part of it with Ukrainophones around the common 
cause, against the common enemy. 
The contested identity in the Eastern part of Ukraine, which is often being called “post-Soviet” 
is hardly related to the identity, which has been constructed in the Soviet Union. It is not the 
remnants of Soviet modernity that prevents the Europeanization of Ukraine but a monstrous 
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neoplasm that has grown upon its ruins. That is why the aggressive anti−Soviet rhetoric of 
many Euromaidan activists misses the target. What is currently confronting the Kyiv 
government has little to do with Soviet ideology and values; instead, it represents a 
phenomenon referred to by the Russian sociologist Lev Gudkov ten years ago as "negative 
identity" which operates primarily with the category of the "enemy". From the perspective of 
pro-Russian protesters, this is the "Banderites" and "nationalists" from Kyiv and western 
Ukraine, who want to destroy "our monuments" and steal "our past". The Lenin monuments 
thus have become a site and symbol of pro−Russian mobilization − "empty signifiers" that 
carry no ideological value but mark local identity as being "anti-Kyiv".72 
The loyalty of the Russian−speaking population to the Ukrainian state had never been tried 
before. Yet the ugly face of pro−Russian separatism, the everyday terror and the anomy it has 
brought to Donbas, have had a sobering effect on many potential Russophiles. In facing the 
separatist threat and Russian aggression, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Kharkiv and other big and 
small cities have rediscovered their "Ukrainianness" and are manifesting it in various ways. 
The undeclared Russo-Ukrainian war has catalyzed the growth of Ukrainian civic rather than 
ethnic nationalism, which was quite a rational and reasonable response of a bi-ethnic and 
bilingual society to the external military threat. First, it framed new identity in a more clear 
and understandable form. The fact is that, with the annexation of Crimea and the military 
conflict in the East, the era of post−Soviet ambiguity and tolerance of blurred identities and 
multiple loyalties has ended.73  
The dramatic developments of spring 2014 have demonstrated that collective identities are 
situational and contextual and can rapidly change, especially under conditions of territorial 
secession, external aggression and military conflict. Moreover, Moscow aggression has 
clarified the main obstacles on the way of Ukrainian integration. 
If according to the survey conducted in 2001, the prevailing definition of the Ukrainian 
community was based on the civic principles including “coexistence and equal rights in the 
framework of one state” as well as respect for the Ukrainian state’s institutions and laws, the 
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more recent surveys showed predominance of nationalistic and ethno-cultural aspects of 
identity.74  
According to the results of the research done by Volodymyr Kulyk in 2016, the differences in 
self-identification within the Ukrainian state were primarily based on the territorial factor and 
less on linguistic. The citizens of Ukraine residing in the Western and Central part of the 
country highlighted their belonging to the Ukrainian nation as predominant, while in the 
Eastern and Southern parts it was less salient, and in the Donbas region it trailed the regional 
and local self-identification.75 
The events of Euromaidan followed with Russian annexation of Crimea and ongoing war in 
Donbas are believed to have caused a growth of national identification in Ukraine. However, 
development of national identity did not lead to significant increase in the use of the 
Ukrainian language. According to numerous surveys, most part of Russian speakers in Ukraine 
argue to be Ukrainian patriots without abandoning their native language. 
As far as the attitude toward Russia is concerned, it has deteriorated to a greater or lesser 
extent in all regions excluding the Donbas. However, in most cases the negative attitude 
toward the state did not extend to the Russian people. “When asked to express their opinion 
about the statement ‘Whatever the authorities do, the Russian people will always be close to 
the Ukrainian one’, 24% of respondents in the 2014 survey fully agreed and a further 40% 
‘rather agreed’, while only 11% more or less firmly objected.”76 
Despite the efforts of the Ukrainian state to construct distinction and alienation of the new 
Ukrainian identity from Russian people, the general attitude at the grassroots level has not 
radically changed. The survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in 
September 2014 has shown that 59% of those who viewed themselves primarily as citizens of 
Ukraine resolutely or hesitantly expressed a friendly attitude towards the Russians. Answering 
the question “Whatever the authorities do, the Russian people will always be close to the 
Ukrainian one” some 24% of the respondents fully agreed with this view and a further 40% 
“rather agreed”, while only 11% firmly objected. These figures imply that proximity between 
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the Ukrainian and Russian peoples remains one of the least contested aspects of Ukrainian 
identity, even if Ukrainians disagree on the exact nature of this proximity.77 However, 43% of 
the respondents placed the responsibility for the ongoing conflict on “Russian authorities 
which provide armed support to the separatists”, while 19% argued that “the participants in 
the Maidan protests who have overthrown the legitimate president of Ukraine” were the 
ones to be responsible for the bloodshed.78  
Moreover, there was a shift in perception of Ukrainian nationalism movement after 2014. For 
instance, the attitude toward Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Ukrainian nationalist 
resistance fighting against the Soviet regime during the World War II, has improved, although 
the majority preserved rather negative impression of him. Consequently, the attitude toward 
Joseph Stalin, who opposed and suppressed the resistance, deteriorated. Such tendency can 
be observed in all regions except for the Donbas, where perception of Bandera became more 
critical, while perception of Stalin less critical. Some participants explicitly criticized the 
actions of today’s nationalists as driven by fashion or even self-interest.79 
The regional differences were evident in regard to the direction of the foreign policy of 
Ukraine. When asked about their integration preferences in March - April 2012, nearly half of 
respondents in the South (47%) and the majority of respondents in the East (60%) chose 
Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union with Russia. In comparison, only 7% of respondents 
in Western Ukraine supported this option while the overwhelming majority (70%) favored 
accession to the EU.80 According to a similar survey conducted in 2015, the support of the 
foreign policy directions was equally distributed between the Western-Central part of Ukraine 
and the East-South. In the West 64% firmly or hesitantly supported the EU integration course, 
while in the East 55% of the respondents favored alliance with Russia.81  
The very meaning of belonging to the Ukrainian nation has changed, a change most vividly 
manifested in the increased alienation from Russia and the greater embrace of Ukrainian 
nationalism as a worldview and, accordingly, as a historical narrative. At the same time, most 
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Ukrainians remain ambivalent about distancing themselves from the Russian people who they 
seek to distinguish from the state pursuing a hostile policy towards Ukraine. Similarly 
ambivalent is the popular perception of Ukrainian nationalism, which seems to be more 
acceptable as an historical phenomenon than a contemporary ideological current. Moreover, 
people in various parts of Ukraine are reluctant to give up their accustomed reliance on the 
Russian language, although they recognize the special role of the titular language as a national 
attribute.  
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2. Conflict Transformation and Dialogue 
2.1. Conflict Transformation 
2.1.1. Conflict transformation discourse 
The traditional discourse of conflict resolution meets more and more criticism both on the 
part of the academia and of the people and organizations on the ground.  
Conflict resolution primarily stands for the assumption that conflicts are short term processes 
with highly adverse effects, which are able to and must be resolved quickly with appropriate 
approach. It sees conflict as a negative state to be replaced by peace and settled with 
favorable agreement. However, the whole idea of conflict resolution often ignores the 
underlying structures and dynamics at play. Researchers in conflict resolution theory argue 
that there is no place for compromise in identity conflicts, so they suggest setting focus on 
reframing positions and interests through analysis and questioning. Thus, they emphasize the 
role of independent non-biased mediators who are able to invest in mutual understanding 
and building new relationships between the conflicting societies. Their role is to look into the 
root reasons of the conflict and find creative solutions benefitting to both parties. The ideas 
of the shift from a zero-sum situation to positive-sum constructive results is in the center of 
conflict resolution approach. The aim is to develop “processes of conflict resolution that 
appear to be acceptable to parties in dispute, and effective in resolving conflict.”82  
Alternatively, as a development from conflict resolution discourse, conflict resolution conflict 
management assumes that finding an appropriate resolution to a conflict is an unrealistic 
goal, thus it aims to at least control, contain, limit, and, if possible, exclude those negative 
attributes conflict generates. Conflict management stands for the assumption that conflicts 
are not completely eradicated even if the attempts of resolution were successful. It claims 
that emphasis to be placed on managing their destructive negative impacts and enhancing 
their advantageous positive components.83 
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Researchers in conflict management theory argue that violent conflicts are usually caused by 
the differences in values and interests, which can emerge both between opposing societies 
and within one complex community. Existing structural institutions, historical background, 
and unequal distribution of power are often the main core reasons generating violence. They 
argue that hardly any efforts are capable of resolving such conflicts, thus the focus must be 
set on managing and containing them, which in long-term perspective can possibly lead to “a 
historic compromise in which violence may be laid aside and normal politics resumed”.84  
Thus, conflict management can be characterized as the approach where appropriate 
intervention from those who have power and resources to assert influence over the 
conflicting parties are the only actors capable of achieving real political settlements. They can 
also contribute to designing and controlling legitimate institutions, through which it is 
possible to guide violence into tolerable direction. Bloomfield and Reilly define conflict 
management as “the positive and constructive handling of difference and divergence. Rather 
than advocating methods for removing conflict, [it] addresses the more realistic question of 
managing conflict: how to deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring opposing sides 
together in a cooperative process, how to design a practical, achievable, cooperative system 
for the constructive management of difference.”85  
Lederach argues that conflict resolution discourse fails to see conflicts as something natural, 
intrinsic to societal development and even in some cases benefitting for it. It frequently treats 
conflicts as entire negative phenomenon, and are “seeking to stop the conflict and create 
harmony at the expense of justice.”86 Moreover, the framework presumes that conflicts are 
always unfavorable; hence they should be controlled and their whole setting should be 
contained. Such approach fails to “capture the broader sense of peacemaking, as it narrows 
its focus to the technical and practical side of the effort.”87  
The primary formula of conflict transformation lies in strong contrast to the ideas of conflict 
resolution discourse and is closely correlated with conflict management. At its core, conflict 
transformation seeks to restructure the ontological foundations of conflicts. It recognizes the 
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necessity of acknowledging the fact that the “very structure of parties and relationships may 
be embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site 
of conflict.”88 Therefore, it is a “process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, 
interests, discourses and…the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of 
violent conflict.”89 
The primal idea of conflict transformation can be reflected through the words of Oliver 
Ramsbotham: “The normative aim of conflict resolution is not to overcome conflict. Conflict 
cannot be overcome – it is an unavoidable feature of social development. And conflict should 
not be overcome, in combating an unjust situation. The aim, rather, is to transform actually 
or potentially violent conflict into non-violent forms of social struggle and social change.”90  
Conflict transformation theory arose from the inability of existing peace-making approaches 
to actually solve modern conflicts by reframing positions or finding win-win outcomes. The 
researchers in this field argue that the causes of violence are not limited to a particular 
conflict, but come from the natural conflictual relationships framed in the structure of parties 
and determining the relationships between them. Conflict transformation aim is therefore 
“to transform the existing conflictual relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the 
very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict.”91 Thus, in order 
to solve the conflict, it is necessary to set focus on the comprehensive long-term 
peacebuilding process and involve all possible parties, including “people within the conflict 
parties, within the society or region affected, and outsiders with relevant human and material 
resources.”92 Such process should be generated through a series of smaller or larger steps 
from a whole variety of actors, who may play an important role at different stages, 
contributing to a common goal. Lederach suggests that “conflict transformation must actively 
envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given 
setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily “see” the setting 
and the people in it as the “problem” and the outsider as the “answer”. Rather, we 
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understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and building on people and 
resources within the setting.”93  
Vayrynen argues that “the bulk of conflict theory regards the issues, actors and interests as 
given and on that basis, makes efforts to find a solution to mitigate or eliminate contradictions 
between them. Yet the issues, actors and interests change over time as a consequence of the 
social, economic and political dynamics of societies.”94  
The principal concepts of conflict transformation, which contrast with other theories and 
make it unique as approach, include delegating more responsibility and decision-making to 
the direct participants of a conflict, as well as broader potential for independent specification 
of key issues at stake or possible solutions. Rupesinghe suggests a comprehensive, eclectic 
approach to conflict transformation that embraces multitrack interventions. He proposes 
building peace constituencies at the grassroots level and across the parties at the civil society 
level (where it exists), and also creating peace alliances with any groups able to bring about 
change, such as business groups, the media and the military.95 Rupesinghe and Anderlini 
argue that such approaches as conflict resolution and conflict management usually imply a 
specific set of activities undertaken by specific actors, whereas conflict transformation 
includes the above mentioned concepts complemented with involvement of other, often less 
significant and less visible actors able to contribute to peace efforts. It is a “fundamental 
conceptual shift in the way global security issues are addressed.”96 The conflict 
transformation theory is more open to operating on the field of historical complexity and 
competing narratives that are inevitable part of modern conflicts. It is more flexible and 
dynamic than conflict resolution and conflict management frameworks, and allows to extend 
operational mandate.  
Conflict transformation assumes conflict to be an important inherent part of social structure. 
It sees conflict as a dynamic process rather than a static condition that needs to be removed. 
Conflict is entangled in a complex network of small and large clashes resulted from the past 
experience and present development, with several actors of different degrees of involvement 
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and with indistinct concepts of enemies and allies. Modern conflicts are dynamic and it is 
seldom possible to predict the pattern they may develop into. Warring parties apply 
sophisticated strategies using violent and non-violent actions to explode the reputation of 
their opponents. Thus, instead of seeking to find a compromise among the parties to meet 
their differing interests, conflict transformation aims at changing the nature and functions of 
violence.97 It seeks to transform those characteristics of systems, cultures and institutions 
that cause violence to escalate. Conflict transformation aims at altering relationships, 
discourses, attitudes and interests, the very structure behind the conflict. Instead of trying to 
elaborate direct measures to resolve conflict or manage the outcomes, it offers to build a 
long-term approach based on the capacities of the people and resources inside the conflict.98  
Parlevliet argues that human rights must be a significant part of the conflict transformation 
process. It should look beyond evident inequalities and attempt to transform the very 
“systems, structures and relationships which give rise to violence and injustice.”99 Such 
approach is in line with Lederach’s conceptualisation of conflict transformation, since he also 
suggests that “the building of right relationships and social structures through a radical 
respect for human rights” is one of the possible ways to follow.100 Both researchers agree that 
neither conflict resolution nor conflict management frameworks pay enough attention to 
social justice and human rights. On the contrary, conflict transformation is able to effectively 
address the “power imbalances and unjust relationships”, which are inevitable part of 
modern conflicts.101  
Some researchers see differing perceptions of identity shown through constructed definitions 
of “us” and “them” as an integral part of modern armed conflicts. They argue that identity 
lays among the major factors contributing to intractability of conflict. Strong enemy images, 
negative stereotypes, scapegoating and dehumanization of opposing parties are common 
characteristic of these types of conflicts.102 Discourse, narratives, myths and tales contribute 
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to the way the past is remembered, identities conceptualized and boundaries drawn between 
groups.103  
Strömbom assumes that public debate and questioning of perceptions of self and others are 
able to significantly contribute to the transformation of identity-based conflicts. It is vital to 
explore the processes fostering formation of collective identities in order to transform the 
whole structures producing violence. Such efforts may help to redefine antagonistic 
relationships and lead to establishment of peaceful relations between warring parties.104  
2.1.2. Transforming identity105 
The prevailing peace mediation and facilitation approaches treat social-psychological 
perceptions as one of the core obstacles obstructing meaningful negotiations. Such obstacles 
must be removed before any attempts to build a dialogue; thus, the identity-related problems 
are excluded from peace-making process. In consequence, “antagonistic identities, collective 
memories and historical narratives are bypassed, not being seen as relevant themes of 
mediation.”106  
In order to achieve sustainable peace, close attention at the early stages of conflict resolution 
must be paid to the transformation of identities and collective memories. These issues cannot 
be ignored before the attempts to resolve conflict start, nor can they be left to the last phase 
of conflict transformation and post-conflict reconciliation. 
Ramsbotham argues that radical disagreement is in the core of the conflict, excluding the 
possibility of rival discourses to coexist peacefully.107 Buckley-Zistel sees antagonistic 
identities as part of a true nature of the conflict, noting that “conflict transformation refers 
to approaches that seek to encourage wider social change through transforming the 
antagonistic relationship between the parties to the conflict.”108 Elaborating on the same 
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assumptions, Vivienne Jabri argues that “moving from war to peace is discursive process that 
requires transformation of identities.”109  
Addressing the same historical events including injustices from different perspectives defines 
the root causes of the conflict, leading to construction of entire groups such as victims and 
perpetrators.110 Narratives about the past used within the conflict discourse usually include 
emotional explanations of historical crimes, legitimacy to possess certain geographic areas, 
or the right of a particular ethnicity to exist. These narratives are being used as a foundation 
for identities to be constructed. In this sense, the conflict transformation is only possible if 
these antagonistic identities and narratives are recognized and included in the peace process. 
The possibility for antagonistic societies to express and hear alternative narratives without 
fueling violence is a prerequisite for sustainable peace. 
If collective memories and constructed narratives of the past are inherent part of the society 
in conflict, they often lead to establishment of “legal frames for how ‘our story’ can be 
remembered.” The alternative “enemy” narratives thus are explained as misunderstanding 
and misinterpreting the past, and basically endanger the whole existence of society.111 
However, Aggestam notes that the recognition of alternative historical narratives through 
apology, symbolic gestures and concessions can lead to a just and durable peace. Dialogue 
provides opportunity to redefine memories and identities, resulting in transformation and 
fusion of the narratives of the past.112  
However, conflict as “ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to 
establish a certain order and organize human coexistence in conditions that are always 
potentially conflictual” can be seen as an integral part of the democratic society.113 Moreover, 
Mouffe argues that antagonism is natural and the close attention must be paid to the 
transformation of the image of potentially dangerous enemy into an adversary “whose ideas 
we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question.”114 Thus, the 
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conflict transformation has to be aimed at transforming societal antagonism into agonism, or 
from violence to peaceful confrontation. 
If the past is usually reflected through the present, while the vision of the future depends on 
the interpretation of both past and present, the matter of such interpretation must be the 
core question of the conflict transformation. Successful revision of the past opens the 
opportunities to build a new collective identity. Such identity should be based not on 
antagonism, but on peaceful coexistence and mutual respect. 
Thus, the foundation for the conflict transformation should be found in rethinking the 
narratives about the past and fusion of horizons of the former enemies. The path from 
antagonism to agonism lies in acceptance of alternative narratives and can lead to 
reconciliation, where “a majority of a society’s members change their beliefs about the 
former adversary, about their own society, and about the relationship between the two 
groups.”115 
Aggestam suggests the “recognitional just peace”, where parties “acknowledge the other 
side’s historical grievances” as “a first step towards recognizing the fact that there are several 
narratives of the conflict.” Understanding the difference and accepting the diversity of 
narratives can contribute to revision of realities and possibly result in implementation of the 
politics of recognition, where the past determines the future.116  
Researchers in conflict transformation theory seem to agree that the simultaneous 
engagement from all concerned actors starting from highest political levels to individual 
grassroots initiatives is the most benefitting to successful transformation.117 Certain 
researchers suggest dialogue to be among the possible drivers to reconceptualize identity and 
construct a new form of relations in conflict. The official discourses of warring parties claiming 
to reflect a particular reality tend to exclude alternative perspectives and interpretations. 
Conflict transformation through deconstruction is aimed at revealing these limits and 
encouraging plural, alternative interpretations. Since belligerent attitudes and perceptions 
are generated in discourse and language, it is possible to alter the discursive settings through 
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communication and dialogue. Dialogue can be successfully used in attempts to reestablish 
trust and understanding, to redefine identity concepts and to improve relationships between 
antagonistic groups. Feller and Ryan argue dialogue must be put to a high priority in peace 
processes and should also be recognized as such by high-level, official actors.118  
2.2. Dialogue in Conflict Transformation 
Feller and Ryan introduce dialogue as “movement aimed at generating coexistence <…> 
through encountering the “other” to share experiences, to think together in creative and 
ﬂexible ways, and to explore assumptions together. Dialogue is holistic, requiring ongoing 
efforts to engage a broad base of society across generations.” They argue that such approach 
to dialogue is crucial component of successful post-conflict transformation leading to stability 
within the society.119  
According to Ramsbotham, the most successful research on radical disagreements can be 
made by analyzing conversation between people with opposing visions of reality. By listening 
to what they have to say, how they continually address background context and interpret 
facts and personalities based on their beliefs framed by political environment, it is possible to 
“plunge into the disagreement itself”120.  
Bohm argues that the special relationship between thinking and speaking is the central part 
of successful dialogue. General discussion on seemingly same matters leads to a deeper 
understanding between opponents. “For example, consider a dialogue . . . when one person 
says something, the other person does not in general respond with exactly the same meaning 
as that seen by the ﬁrst person. Rather, the meanings are only similar and not identical. Thus, 
when the second person replies, the ﬁrst person sees a difference between what he meant 
to say and what the other person understood. On considering this difference, he may then be 
able to see something new.”121 Thus, dialogue is able to provide room for breaking the 
boundaries of misunderstanding and misinterpretation between antagonistic societies, which 
contributes to conflict transformation. 
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Within the framework of conflict transformation dialogue is mainly aimed at deconstruction 
of enemy images and narrative and construction of shared meanings and narratives. Dialogue 
is the necessary link from antagonism to agonism. Feller and Ryan approach dialogue as 
“movement aimed at generating coexistence and does so through encountering the “other” 
to share experiences, to think together in creative and flexible ways, and to explore 
assumptions together”.122 Using dialogue in peace-making process is unique inherent part of 
conflict transformation and reconciliation, which abstract it from other conflict resolution 
practices. 
When dialogue is understood as an act of sharing, it contributes to changing the vision of the 
other as the enemy, building enduring structures, where different societies are able to coexist 
peacefully.123 Richard Sennett notes that dialogue and seeking for a common ground may not 
necessarily end up with a shared agreement, but through “the process of exchange people 
may become more aware of their own views and expand their understanding of one 
another.”124  
However, it is crucial that dialogue as part of conflict transformation process is not focused 
on studying identity itself, but it should look at identification. Researching the processes of 
perception and categorization should be the core element of peaceful dialogue. The shift from 
identities to identification, from narratives to their construction and execution, from those 
who carry identity to those who cultivate it must be in the center of conflict transformation.  
Constructive dialogue can be the necessary ground for conflict parties to “discuss their 
differences with the objective of clarifying them and attempting to find a solution that 
integrates the best thoughts that emerge during the discussion, no matter who articulates 
them.” Simple discussion and exchange of views can result in deeper understanding of 
antagonist picture of the world and enriching views of the matter that is initially in 
controversy. Floyer Acland argues “it is the tangle of material interests, emotions, prejudices, 
vanities, past experiences, personal insecurities and immediate feelings that drive disputes 
and make them so hard to resolve: these are the real issues. People are not motivated by 
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facts: they are motivated by their perceptions of the facts, their interpretations of the facts, 
their feelings about the facts.”125 
The aim of dialogue is not to find who is right and who is wrong or whose interpretation of 
the truth has more right to exist, but to overcome “misunderstanding, a failure of 
communication, a clash of values, a collision of equally valid interests.”126 The aim is to 
discover that interpretations, goals and directions might be different, but equally essential 
and valuable. 
Moreover, dialogue can be successfully held between ordinary members of the antagonistic 
groups and result in “increased understanding and trust among the participants with some 
eventual positive effects on public opinion.”127 “The aim is to improve communication, 
sensitivity, critical self-awareness and mutual understanding between individuals and groups, 
the lack of which is seen to be a key ingredient in generating the social milieu in which violent 
conflict breeds.”128 Through dialogue it is possible to enable open communication, honest 
speaking, and genuine listening. It serves as a universal platform for people to express their 
assumptions, to question their previous judgments and worldviews, and to change the way 
they think.  
The truly constructive dialogue is only possible if participants are willing to open themselves 
to new meanings, to engage in genuine dialogue, and to constantly respond to the new 
demands emanating from the situation. The point of the dialogue is to deepen mutual 
understanding, to expand sympathy and imagination, to exchange not only arguments but 
also sensibilities, to take a critical look at oneself, to build up mutual trust, and to arrive at a 
more just and balanced view of both the contentious issues and the world in general.129 
Ramsbotham underlines that significant attention in discourse and dialogue must be payed 
to terminology and language used to manifest “radical disagreements” in conflict. He implies 
that understanding the agonistic dialogue among adversaries is crucial in terms of conflict 
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transformation.130 However, the strategies must be tailor-made for different contexts. He 
brings up a grassroots dialogue as an example, which can build “the whole foundation for 
future transformation” but, at the same time, may fail to yield positive results if there is a 
formidable opposition on political level.131 Overall, grassroots dialogue as means in conflict 
transformation attempts has been largely acknowledged as useful in recent studies. 
Maddison argues that a significant part of processes contributing to transformation of 
conflicts takes place in low profile inter-communal dialogue rather than in frames of high-
level initiatives.132 Northrup sees grassroots dialogue as a safer space for deconstructing 
negative images of the perceived enemy.133  
Approaches to initiate dialogue may vary in different contexts, but the basic idea is to provide 
a sustainable ground to exchange views on sensitive issues and to build mutual understanding 
undermined by conflict. Francis suggests workshops to be efficient in sharing knowledge and 
increasing the capacity of individuals for constructive action.134 Ryan claims that any projects 
contributing to cooperation and communication between antagonistic societies, such as 
construction and agriculture projects or even cooperation within sports and music, are 
capable to start positive relations and contribute to conflict transformation.135  
In general, some researchers, including Kriesberg argue that conflict transformation is not an 
alternative research juxtaposing to seemingly inefficient conflict resolution and conflict 
management studies, but a complex of ideas and suggestions suitable to be incorporated as 
a complement into any conflict resolution, mediation or peacebuilding process.136 Both 
Miall137 and Kriesberg138 agree that conflict transformation still needs further research. 
Especially it is relevant in terms of its possible impacts on conflicts, as the actual 
implementation of the theory is rare to observe yet.  
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Conflict transformation could be the only appropriate solution for complex conflicts, the 
whole nature of which is caused by internal factors. It fits to the context of Russia-Ukraine 
conflict where parties share historical and cultural past and have the potential to improve 
future relationships. Although there are signs that direct violence has declined and the 
situation in general has stabilized since the start of the conflict, it has come to the point where 
the attempts to find a solution from the outside with participation of both warring parties 
and international observers are doomed to failure. However, it is important to keep in mind 
that the process of conflict transformation from destructive to constructive is often uneven 
and asymmetrical. The parties usually transform at different paces, and progress is followed 
by regression and then progress again.  
Within such constructed reality, it is crucial to build a dialogue between two warring societies 
not to decide whose story is more truthful, but at least to express different views, experiences 
and narratives. While narratives of the past provide anchorage for politico-cultural identities, 
they often represent the ‘other’ as a threat. Identity conflicts are thus fueled by discourses of 
historical enmity, hatred and polarization, which intensify the basic existential fears for group 
survival. 
Although the conflict is far from being resolved, it is worth to think about possible post-
conflict reintegration. Reconciliation is rather impossible because the underlying values for 
both groups are incompatible and cannot be quickly altered, if at all. Instead, some argue that 
Ukrainian politicians should think about accommodation: one group could manage to 
guarantee some autonomy for the other group, respecting its values. It is very unlikely that 
authoritarian Ukraine, modelled on Putin’s Russia and epitomized in Donbas, can provide such 
autonomy for democratically minded, Europe-oriented citizens. The Kremlin-ruled Crimea 
illustrates actually the opposite. However, it is quite possible that democratic Ukraine could 
find a way to accommodate its paternalistic, Soviet-minded, and Russia-oriented Ukrainians. 
Given that both sides of the ongoing Ukrainian war present aggressive antagonistic narratives, 
actively use historical myths and propaganda as the tools of a new hybrid warfare, it is 
possible to presume it belongs to the sphere of identity conflicts. Typical instruments in such 
type of war are creating a new reality, where it is hardly possible to know the reality. The 
whole notion of the truth disappears in the often-contradictory media reports from both 
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warring parties, while the observers, not having the direct access to the battleground, can 
only repeat and multiply the information provided by the propaganda machine. A possible 
facilitation of the situation could be achieved through direct dialogue of the warring societies. 
Though no shared agreement may be reached, through the process of exchange people may 
become more aware of their own views and expand their understanding of one another.  
Although most of studies on construction of identity put focus on official initiatives 
contributing to development of identity, it is important to note that ordinary people play a 
significant role in nation-building process. Construction and/or deconstruction of identity at 
the bottom level has the power to shift the official discourse. The authority of citizens is not 
limited with mere rejection or acceptation of certain political initiatives, but they are able to 
interpret and renegotiate these initiatives, as well as embed new meanings into various 
objects and practices contributing to nation-building in a spontaneous way.  
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3. Video dialogue between Ukrainian and Russian students 
The first attempt to stop violence and to overcome misunderstanding between the parties in 
the Russia-Ukraine conflict with the help of the dialogue at the bottom level was made on 
March 11, 2014, when the students of the Kiev National Theater University uploaded a short 
video onto popular media hosting website Youtube.com, in which they addressed all Russian 
citizens and expressed concerns with the tensions in Crimea. They stressed the integrity of 
Ukraine and its legal right for the peninsula. Although the message had rather peaceful mood 
with appeals for peace and brotherly nature of the two societies, it did not generate any 
media attention nor any responses from the Russian side. 
Almost a year later, a similar attempt to build a bridge over the mutual misunderstanding 
between the warring societies established by the national media were undertaken by the 
students of several Kiev universities. On January 27, 2015 they released a video message on 
Youtube, which quickly became popular. In their video the students shed light on what they 
believed had happened in Kiev during the Euromaidan events and what consequences it had 
had. They admitted sharing responsibility for what have been happening, so they decided to 
overcome the information barrier established by the both governments in attempts to 
influence the situation. In particular, they asked their counterparts from Moscow universities 
to join their efforts and to start questioning the information they hear and see in the news.  
“We stand on the opposite sides of the barricades, and the kilometers of 
misunderstanding lie between us. The tales about Nazis and Ukrainian nationalists lie 
between us… Both you and us will have to explain our children, why we have been 
shooting at each other and have done nothing to prevent the war.”139 
The message of the video was in line with the popular expectations in the society, which for 
the first time in Ukrainian independent history managed to challenge the corrupted regime 
and turn the official discourse to the Western direction, which by many seemed as the 
direction for development. Thus, the students applauded the events on Euromaidan as a shift 
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for the better, while critically appraised the Russian aggression in the East and its annexation 
of Crimea.  
The video attracted mass media attention and generated a series of video responses from 
different countries. Among the first to reply were the students from Kaliningrad universities. 
In the video released on February 1, 2015 they strictly criticized the Ukrainian interpretation 
of the events and asked their colleagues to “raise an information curtain”. Every sentence 
expressed in the initial Ukrainian video was interpreted through the prism of official Russia’s 
position concerning the events in Ukraine. Thus, according to them, the Russian media 
presented the truthful picture of the events, the events on Euromaidan leading to the ouster 
of the president were illegal, the Ukrainian activists and the new government were 
responsible for the violence in the East, and the Crimean referendum and its following 
annexation was in frame of international law.  
You say that Banderites and Nazis are a tale. Are the victims of Maidan and bombed 
cities of Donbass being tales as well? You will have to explain your children why you 
were shooting to us. We have not raised arms against our brothers. We will not be 
ashamed of our history.140 
A few days after the Kaliningrad video was released, the media agency Newsfront, which 
along with RT found financial support from Kremlin and is notoriously known as one of its 
major tools in the propaganda machine, released an appeal for all Russian students to film 
more video messages depicturing the official point of view. In the period from February 5 to 
February 10, altogether 28 videos from all major cities in Russia were published on the official 
Youtube channel with the similar titles “The message of <City> students to the students of 
Ukraine.” It is not known who the people in these videos are, what terms were offered to 
them and whether they were paid or not, but all of them with rare exceptions look as they 
were directed in haste, without any sincere ideas and were guided with the same scenario or 
a set of key words. Among the main ideas expressed in those videos are the brotherly nature 
of the two nations, their common history (in particular the struggle against Nazi Germany 
during the World War II), legal status of Crimean referendum, absence of Russian military in 
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Donbass, the corrupted authorities in Kiev who are responsible for violence led by self-
enrichment, the West and in particular America as the main enemy and propaganda 
generator instead of Russia, and finally the appeal for Ukraine to reject the Western political 
direction and unite with Russia against the common enemy.  
Some students from Russia did not support this discourse and were willing to express their 
own opinion. As a result, a group of students from the Moscow universities took the initiative. 
In their video published on February 12, they expressed gratitude for the efforts of Ukrainian 
students to start a dialogue beyond the information curtain. As a start they accepted their 
guilt over the events in Ukraine, asked forgiveness and promised to do everything possible to 
stop the war. They also criticized the aggressive policy undertaken by Moscow in Crimea and 
its support of the tensions in the East. In the end, they agreed to support the dialogue with 
their Ukrainian counterparts. 
A huge gap grows between our countries, and we, students, will be the bridge over it. 
We are on the same side with you, because in an information war it is criminal to be 
on any side, but the truth.141 
Before heading to the practical results of above-mentioned initiatives and conclusions, it is 
reasonable to mention other video messages from the list. Thus, a group of students from 
Lvov universities tried to deconstruct certain myths about Ukrainian nationalists they 
supposed are believed in Russia. They argued there was not hate nor oppression towards 
Russians in Ukraine. They highlighted the brotherly nature of the two nations, but insisted on 
an independent path of Ukraine. Hence, they agreed to contribute to the struggle against 
misinformation. 
Among other videos from Ukrainian students were those which were in the same mood as 
the videos published by Newsfront, but bearing the opposite, anti-Russian opinion. For 
instance, the students from Ivano-Frankovsk in their video put all blame on the Russian side, 
accusing Kremlin of framing and fueling the war, while the Russian people of following their 
authorities as “sheep”. Other videos of Ukrainian students hold rather positive mood. The 
students mostly appealed to build a dialogue in order to deconstruct misinformation 
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constructed by both sides within the information war. The videos from Crimea and disputed 
territories in Eastern Ukraine were either in line with Newsfront position, or expressed the 
will to stop the violence without accusing any side.  
With a simple search query, altogether 44 relevant videos were collected. After the analysis, 
all videos were divided into 3 categories based on the region, and a video from Moldova and 
a video from the USA were excluded as irrelevant to the topic. The first category included 7 
videos published by Ukrainian students. The second category included 3 videos from the self-
proclaimed republics in the East of Ukraine and 2 videos from Crimea.  The final category 
included 30 videos from Russia. All videos are presented in the Annex 1 with date of release, 
link, general mood of the message (anti-Russian, anti-Ukrainian, or generally positive), and 
the main ideas expressed in the message. 
The analysis of the videos was made by answering 4 key questions:  
Firstly, in identity-based conflicts symbols and myths become inevitable parts of identity, as 
they are the objects of mental representations and struggle over narratives and 
interpretations. They belong to the realm of perception and appreciation, of cognition and 
recognition, where different involved parties invest their interests and their presuppositions, 
and of objectified representations in things or acts. They become a part of various self-
interested strategies of symbolic manipulation, which are mostly aimed at determining the 
representation that other people may form of these properties and their bearers. For 
example, the symbols represented in the Western Ukrainian videos reflect the reality created 
during the events of 2014 in Ukraine and later supported and developed in the official 
discourse. Thus, the first question is: What symbols are used in the videos? Are they 
constructed? What do they represent? What myths are supported and deconstructed? 
Secondly, the language often serves as a tool to construct a particular version of reality with 
particular interpretation of events and personalities, which is constructed for particular 
purpose.  The general experience of the facts supposes that they have a concrete existence 
in the world, but they are all brought into being through language. There are only numerous 
constructions of the world, thus, references to the truth and facts are only references to the 
notions based on personal interpretations generated by culturally and historically specific 
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factors. The application of language in this sense is the field where material objects and social 
formations obtain meaning and where the competing versions of reality are constructed in 
the service of interest and power. Thus, the second question is: What language is used in 
reference to such objects as the conflict, the events of 2014, the Donbass regions, the 
referendum in Crimea, and Russia? 
Thirdly, with most ethnic Russians and Russian speakers living in the southeast, identity 
contestation in Ukraine has a significant regional dimension. Thus, the “Eastern Slavic 
identity” is based on identification with Russia, while the “ethnic Ukrainian identity” is based 
on distancing from Russia and identification with Europe. After Ukraine had lost control over 
some territories with dominant Russian identity, the official discourse in the rest of Ukraine 
started to juxtapose “victimized and peaceful Ukraine” and “aggressive Russia positing a 
constant threat to Ukraine.” Therefore, Russia in Ukrainian media and political discourse is 
depicted as aggressive and imperialist, thus emphasizing the differences in culture, political 
orientation, and values between the two states, while the new Ukrainian government is 
demonized in Russia-oriented videos. Hence, the third question is: What is the attitude of the 
speakers towards Russia and towards Ukraine? What are relations between Russian and 
Ukrainian nations in their opinion? 
Finally, although the initial intentions of the students were to build a dialogue between the 
conflicting societies and de-escalate violence, the speakers expressed different ideas how 
these aims can be achieved, while some of the follow-up videos introduced alternative offers. 
Thus, the final question is: What is the purpose of the video message? What suggestions are 
expressed? 
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3.1. Western Ukrainian videos 
 
Western Ukrainians videos on the map 
 
The videos labeled as “Western Ukrainian” represent five different cities in Ukraine: Kiev, 
Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, Khmelnitskyi, and Vinnytsia. All of them geographically belong to the 
part of Ukraine, historically named as “Western Ukraine”.  
3.1.1. Symbols and myths 
The very first video released in March 2014, right after the shift of power in Kiev and the 
notorious referendum in Crimea, starts with the images of a boy playing blue and yellow piano 
in a street. The colors represent the official colors of Ukrainian flag, which along with the 
national coat of arms became crucial signs of Ukrainian revolution and Ukrainian identity. The 
next frames show a pile of burning garbage followed by a picture of local citizens 
reconstructing a destroyed brick pavement.142 All these frames depict the timeline of 
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Euromaidan. Initially it started as a peaceful demonstration against the foreign policy of the 
Yanukovych government. After the power was used to disperse the demonstrators, the 
protest escalated into open riots. At that time, the news channels broadcasting the events 
showed the pictures of piles of burning tires, barricades, and local militia confronting the 
official police forces. When the president fled the country and the new interim government 
came into power, the Maidan square was reconstructed. All these events are symbolically 
depicted in the first frames of the video message. Another significant symbol used in this 
video is a picture of the students carrying banner with antiwar slogans. As the video was 
released before the escalation of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the students as well as other 
Ukrainian citizens were concerned with possible aggression of Russia and its interference. At 
that time the conflict was not seemed as inevitable and people have been trying to prevent 
it.143 
Next videos, which were released a year after the first one, were created in the circumstances 
when the conflict has already escalated, while the new Ukrainian government constructed a 
new discourse aimed at nationalization and development of an independent Ukrainian 
identity based on the Western Ukrainian culture and narratives. While most students in the 
videos wore either neutral clothing or the t-shirts with the logos of their universities, which 
highlighted their adherence to the student community in general and to their educational 
institutions in particular, some of the students was dressed in Ukrainian national clothes, so 
called “vyshyvankas”.144 In 2014, the government initiated the promotion of vyshyvanka, 
which contributed to its becoming a mainstream attribute of Ukrainian patriots.  
Besides visual part of the videos, the symbols can be found in the words of the speakers. The 
first Kiev video ends with an extract from the most famous poem of Taras Shevchenko. The 
poet is known as the founder of modern Ukrainian literature and the Ukrainian language, as 
well as an active promoter of the independence of Ukraine in the 19th century. Thus, he has 
become one of the symbols of independent Ukraine. Another video from Ivano-Frankovsk 
shows students vocalizing a poem-message to their Russian counterparts. A quotation from 
the message says: “Here your father, or maybe your brother, aims at my mother and my 
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bride.”145 The masculine image of an aggressor and the feminine image of a defender has 
been always widely used during many military conflicts in Soviet Union and earlier in imperial 
Russia. The world-known image of Soviet Motherland depicted as a woman calling up the 
population to defend the country against the German invader is the most vivid example. It is 
interesting how the idea develops in the Ukrainian context with now Russia serving as a 
masculine aggressor and Ukraine as a feminine defender.  
Another symbol inherited from the Soviet times can be found in the video from Vinnitsa. In 
efforts to deconstruct some popular myths about “nationalist government” in Kiev, the 
students mention the annual parades and “eternal flames” honoring the memory of the 
veterans of the World War II. According to the students, these symbols signify that “nobody 
is forgotten, nothing is forgotten”.146 The words firstly used by Olga Bergholz in her poem for 
a monument in 1959 became a symbol of people’s commemoration with the heroism of the 
Soviet soldiers in the war. Surprisingly, either group of students mentioned Bandera or the 
UPA in their videos. The Ukrainian government issued several laws, which granted the 
veterans of UPA who had collaborated with Nazi Germany and had fought against the Soviet 
regime during the World War II, with the same rights as the veterans of the Red Army. 
Moreover, it acknowledged Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Ukrainian anti-Soviet 
movement, as the national hero, and has been contributing to his promotion as one of the 
symbols of the Ukrainian independence. However, the students were not willing to embrace 
this new constructed symbol, and has chosen to keep the traditional memories and symbols 
of the War.   
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Ukrainian students wearing national clothes – “Vyshyvanka” 
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Some of the symbols reflect the myths and stereotypes constructed shortly after the conflict 
has escalated. Several video messages use such terms and notions as “fascists”, “right sector”, 
“Banderites”, and “junta”. These terms reflect the narrative constructed by the Russian 
propaganda machine in order to highlight the illegitimacy of the new government in Ukraine. 
They often can be found in the news of official Russian media, as well as in the commentaries 
and discussions about Ukraine in different pro-Russian sources of information. The Ukrainian 
students use these terms to emphasize the biased nature of Russian discourse and ask their 
Russian colleagues to avoid using this terminology. Indeed, application of such emotionally 
filled words and definitions obstruct building of a constructive dialogue. It seems that many 
Russians do not understand the constructed nature of this discourse, thus the attempt to 
deconstruct it through bringing it up into dialogue can contribute to deeper understanding of 
the antagonistic relations between the two societies.  
However, some myths are also used in reference to Russia. Several video messages refer to 
the referendum in Crimea as a “referendum with rifles.” This phrase was constructed by 
Ukrainian media in order to highlight the illegitimacy of Crimean referendum in 2014. The 
popular discourse argues that local residents of Crimea were forced to vote for independence 
and further affiliation with Russia by Russian military present on the peninsula. Although the 
presence of the so called “little green men” in Crimea has been proven by several sources, 
their actual contribution to the results of the referendum is questionable.  
Another highly negatively biased reference towards Russia can be found in the same poem 
video message from Ivano-Frankovsk. The information about the situation in Ukraine 
provided by Russian media is named as “the tales of the big brother”.147 The reference to the 
novel by George Orwell is aimed to emphasize the totalitarian nature of the regime in Russia, 
as well as the absence of independent media. Although the work of the propaganda media in 
Russia is beyond doubt and the lack of democracy under Putin presidency is frightening, the 
comparison of the general situation in Russia with the society depicted in “1984” is 
exaggerated and reflects either the emotional bias of the speakers or the intentional attempt 
to depict the “aggressor” negatively.  
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3.1.2. Language and terminology 
Although the videos from Western Ukraine mostly bear peaceful message, the language used 
by students often has negative connotation in reference to Russia, Yanukovych regime, and 
referendum in Crimea, while exalted in cases where Euromaidan and the new government 
are concerned.  
Thus, while referring the events of Euromaidan, most videos use the term “revolution of 
dignity”.  The term, being initially elaborated by Ukrainian former MP from Svodoba party 
Yuriy Syrotyuk, was supported and vocalized for the first time by his party fellow Oleh 
Tyahnybok during the riots in December 2013. The term hereafter has become a symbol of 
Ukrainian independence from Russia and its unique political course in the Post-Soviet space. 
Although the term is widely used in all Ukrainian media, as well as among the population and 
political elites, its usage in other countries reflects pro-Ukrainian position of a speaker. The 
substitute terms “Euromaidan revolution” or “2014 Ukrainian revolution” have more neutral 
connotation without introducing any attitudes nor opinions.  
The bias of the video messages can be noticed in juxtaposition of the Yanukovych government 
with the Euromaidan activists. In the second video from Kiev, former Ukrainian president 
Yanukovych is described as a dictator and a failed president, while his presidency is depicted 
as “total corruption, unconditional rejection of European integration, censored media, and 
lawlessness of police”.148 The riots on the Maidan are referred only as “peaceful protests”, 
while the actions of local police to stop the unrest as “bloody response”. Thus, the use of 
violence from the Euromaidan activists is justified with their “just cause” in struggle against 
the corrupted regime, while the response from the government is seen as illegal and abusive.  
Since the official Ukrainian position concerning the annexation of Crimea and the separatist 
intentions of the Eastern regions claims that Ukraine is the only legitimate actor to possess 
these territories, the speakers in the videos tend to avoid expressing their attitude towards 
the citizens of these territories and the situation in general. Thus, Crimea is always referred 
as “autonomous republic of Crimea”, the official title of the region before the events of 2014. 
As for the separatist regions, the speakers use strictly neutral titles such as “the East of 
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Ukraine” or “Donbass”. Thus, there are no comments neither on who possesses the territories 
at the time, nor on what the intentions and reasons of the local residents are.   
Moreover, it is interesting that the attitude towards the whole conflict is not shown in the 
videos. It is mentioned, however, that the fighting sides in the East include Ukrainian army 
and “Russian regular army”, while the local residents are called “peaceful citizens”. Thus, the 
locals are not seen as participants of the conflict. It seems that the speakers intentionally miss 
their role in the conflict in order to avoid any associations with civil war. On the one hand, it 
exculpates all responsibility from the locals and facilitates possibility for their reintegration 
and reconciliation. On the other hand, such position does not reflect the real situation, since 
the major contribution to the conflict comes from the local authorities, while Russia acts as 
their supporter with arms, volunteers and possibly army. In this sense, the dialogue is only 
possible if the position towards the Eastern residents is determined and their part in the 
conflict is admitted.  
3.1.3. Russia and Ukraine 
Since the Ukrainian identity has always been closely related with Russia, while the discussions 
whether the two nations are different, close or the same, the opinions concerning this matter 
expressed in the videos significantly differ.  
For instance, in the video from Kiev of 2014, the students emphasize that the Russians and 
the Ukrainians are “one nation”. In order to emphasize the unacceptability of possible conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine, as well as to prevent its escalation, the speakers argue that 
together they are the “strong and mighty nation”, “united with common spirit”.149 
The video message from other group of students from Kiev released a year later, describe the 
Russians and the Ukrainians as “one nation before recent changes”.150 Thus, they accept the 
closeness of the two nations, but the differences in attitudes towards certain issues have 
separated them. Such approach reflects the idea that after the Euromaidan, the Ukrainian 
identity has become closely bound with democracy and the West, whilst the Russian 
language, culture, and identity have become closely bound with authoritarianism and the 
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Soviet past. Thus, in order to emphasize the independent course of Ukraine towards the 
integration with Europe and to distance it from the course of the “aggressor state”, the two 
nations are depicted as separated. 
These ideas go even further in other videos. For example, in the video message from Lvov, 
the close link between the two nations is explained with their Slavic origin and long common 
history, but their distinction is undisputed. Such approach excludes any other connections, 
such as close cultures, the Russian language spoken in both countries, and some part of the 
population being the bearers of Russian identity. Leaving behind all these factors and building 
the relations only on belonging to the Slavic family does not reflect the reality in Ukraine, thus 
it tends to alienate a significant part of the population from the official discourse. In this sense, 
such approach obstructs the constructive dialogue and might fuel the further escalation of 
the conflict.  
If the attitude towards relations between the two nations differs in different videos and at 
least emphasizes their closeness in certain matters and distinction in others, the attitude 
towards Russia is generally common and negative. Mostly Russia is depicted as an aggressor 
with “imperial ambitions”. The scale of negative attitudes starts with the idea expressed in 
the Lvov video that “the Russians do not understand and do not accept another version of 
history”, and ends with the Russians being either sheep following their leader without having 
their own opinion, or the “rude nation”, which “has lost humanity” and “wants to destroy 
everything” guided with “hate and bloodlust”.151 In the Ivano-Frankovsk video “Russian 
accent and flag are associated with death”, whilst in the Lvov video Russia is contraposed to 
the “civilized world”.152 Thus, the speakers use the highly negative comparisons and language 
in relation to Russia, mock its values, and thus construct the demonized image, which does 
not reflect their proclaimed intentions to deconstruct myths, eliminate misunderstanding, 
and build a dialogue free of stereotypes and hate speech.  
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3.1.4. Proposals 
Since the messages and suggestions expressed in the videos differ, it is reasonable to mention 
all of them one by one. 
The first Kiev video was made before the major events, which destabilized the relations 
between Russia and Ukraine, the main purpose of the video was to prevent the escalation of 
the conflict. Thus, the students asked their Russian counterparts to keep the integrity of 
Ukraine and to maintain peaceful relationships.  
The second Kiev video has initiated the further exchange of videos, although it was not the 
initial aim. In fact, the students asked their colleagues to avoid the influence of Russian 
propaganda and to start 
checking and questioning 
the information in media. 
They also expressed the 
will to compete in the 
Olympics and academic 
competitions.  
The main aim expressed in 
the first Lvov video was to 
deconstruct the myths and 
stereotypes about the 
Western Ukrainians, which 
had been constructed by 
Russian media. The 
students also suggested to 
continue the “Marches of 
Peace” in Russia. This 
suggestion is the reference 
to the anti-war protests, 
which took place in Russia 
on 2 and 15 March 2014 
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before the Crimean referendum, and later in September 2014. The demonstrations, which 
are believed to gather 20 000 people, were aimed at support of Ukraine and prevention of 
Russian interference. After the Russian government started the intense media propaganda, 
the initiatives stopped. 
The video from Ivano-Frankovsk was the students’ expression of their attitude towards the 
Russian aggression. The speakers did not offer any particular initiatives, but showed their 
negative attitude and asked to stop the interference into Ukraine’s internal affairs. 
The students from Khmelnitsky followed the voice of the second Kiev video. They suggested 
that the hate between the two societies in the Internet is constructed with provocations by 
“paid trolls” and aggressive policy from media sources. Thus, they asked not to follow the 
provocations and not to multiply hate. They also repeated the request to check and question 
the information provided by media.  
The second video from Lvov was made as a direct answer to the Russian video from Moscow. 
They expressed gratitude for bravery of the students and expressed the willingness to join the 
efforts to deconstruct illusions and stop violence. 
The video from Vinnitsa was made as a response to another Russian video from Kaliningrad. 
They claimed that Ukrainian nation is highly united and there is no civil war in the country. 
They also brought up certain absurd fake news from Russian media sources, as well as the 
facts that their city has been accepting refugees from Donbass. Such message can serve as a 
practical realization of the offer to start a dialogue expressed by the students from the second 
Kiev video. Moreover, they suggested to go beyond video messages and build an “information 
bridge” in order to continue the discussion online. 
3.1.5. Conclusion 
Since the videos were made by students from the Western regions of Ukraine, the assumption 
was that the messages had to be in line with the Western Ukrainian identity. The speakers 
wore the national cloths, which had been successfully promoted by the Ukrainian government 
as one of the true national symbols along with its flag and coat of arms. Meaningfully, the 
students from several videos used quotations from or direct references to Taras Shevchenko. 
The poet is recognized by the Ukrainian government as another symbol of the Ukrainian 
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nation and culture. The crucial distinction from the official discourse was the rejection of 
Stepan Bandera as a national hero and the positive role of the anti-Soviet Ukrainian 
movement during the World War II. The students decided to keep the traditional memories 
of the War, which are close to the Russian ones. Hence, not all the symbols, which the student 
referred to in their video messages, are adopted from Ukrainian official political discourse.  
Although most of the references to the symbols from the Soviet time are used either in 
neutral connotations as if they were common parts of Ukrainian identity, or in ironic negative 
way to highlight differences between Ukraine and Russia, the sacral significance of the War 
as part of the common Ukrainian and Russian history is secured. 
The position regarding the Euromaidan is unilateral in all videos. Former president 
Yanukovych is depicted as a dictator with bad governance and is used as the main justification 
for the bloodshed occurred during the “revolution of dignity”. However, no evaluation of the 
new government is expressed. Thus, the Euromaidan is seen as a right deed, whilst its results 
are omitted from mentioning.  
No dominant attitude towards the Russians can be distinguished from the videos. The 
attitudes range from highly negative, emphasizing the aggressive nature of the Russian nation 
and its lack of independence, to positive, referring to its closeness with the Ukrainian nation 
due to common past and close culture. Surprisingly, neither group of students emphasized 
the coexistence of two identities in Ukraine. The Eastern Ukrainian identity was not 
mentioned at all, while the residents of Donbass were not granted with any differences from 
the titular Ukrainian nation. The whole idea of two identities in Ukraine, which has deep roots 
and has been dominant in Ukrainian political discourse, as well as has played the key role 
during every election and has determined the internal policy of Ukraine from the time of its 
gaining independence in 1991 until the events of 2014, completely disappeared from 
Ukrainian official agenda. Hence, the Donbass became alienated from the rest of Ukraine, 
whilst the other Eastern regions lost their distinctness. It is hard to be certain whether it is 
the results of the Ukrainian unification against the common enemy, or just a total disregard 
of the identity issues in Eastern Ukraine. 
However, the attitude towards Russia is unanimously negative. Most videos referred to it as 
an “aggressor state” with imperial ambitions. Russia is also referred as the main initiator and 
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one of the two warring parties in the Donbass conflict along with Ukraine. Thus, local citizens 
are not seen as the participants of the conflict, and are depicted as the victims of the Russian 
aggression. Moreover, the signs of civil war are either avoided or intentionally omitted, hence 
the guilt for violence is put exclusively on Russia. 
The position towards Crimea is fragmented. If the referendum is unanimously seen as illegal 
and forced by the Russian army, hence the region is considered to remain the integral part of 
Ukraine, the Crimeans are not recognized as direct participants of decision-making in the 
region. There no articulated speculations about their motifs and opinions. Thus, the fact of 
the referendum is referred as illegal with alleged violations, but there are no suggestions 
either for additional referendum with international observers in order to make it legal, or for 
any other solutions of the problem. 
Thus, in general, the identity represented by the Western Ukrainian videos can be described 
as Western Ukrainian, but the students expressed certain disagreements with the official 
discourse of their government, especially concerning the narratives of the World War II.  
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3.2. Eastern Ukrainian videos 
 
Eastern Ukrainian videos on the map 
 
3.2.1. Symbols and myths 
The cities, where Eastern Ukrainian videos were made, are officially considered to be a 
legitimate part of Ukraine. For many years during the Soviet times and after Ukraine gained 
independence in 1991, the residents of this regions identified themselves as Ukrainians. 
Although their identity was different from the other parts of Ukraine, they were legitimate 
bearers of Eastern Ukrainian identity. The differences included Russian as the main 
communication language, close cultural and historical ties with Russia, the shared historical 
narrative, which put more significance to the common past, shared achievements and 
tragedies during the Soviet times and excluded the significance of Ukrainian struggle for 
independence, and the vision of Ukrainian development course in close association with 
Russia, instead of Europe. Notably, all these differences did not prevent Eastern Ukrainians 
from active participation in Ukrainian political life, and significantly contribute to its foreign 
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policy decision-making processes. However, the speakers of the Eastern Ukrainian videos 
seem to have lost their Ukrainian self-identification and have alienated from other parts of 
Ukraine. 
Such symbols, which were present in the Western Ukrainian videos, as national cloths, 
Ukrainian flag and coat of arms, and respect for Ukrainian artists and war heroes are totally 
missing in the Eastern Ukrainian videos. However, there are no signs of any alternative 
national symbols, such as Russian or local flags or historical figures. Thus, it is possible to 
assume that the speaker has lost their former identification with Ukraine, but have not gained 
any alternative identities.  
The only visual symbols, which could be noticed in the videos, are the student cards. The 
students from Donetsk have questioned the student identities of the speakers from the 
second Kiev video, suspecting them to be actors hired by Ukrainian authorities. This 
assumption was quite common in the commentaries to the video. Moreover, there were 
several published videos, where speakers tried to prove the fake nature of the Ukrainian 
video. Although all the “proofs” were fabricated, the popularity of such videos along with 
huge amount of commentaries supporting this idea (which were probably left by so-called 
“paid trolls”) have contributed to its spread. The student cards shown in the Donetsk video 
are supposed to prove the independence and neutrality of the speakers. Thus, the speakers 
identify themselves mostly with the international “student brotherhood”, leaving behind 
national or local identities.153  
All videos put much significance to the symbolism of the Ukrainians being among the active 
participants and victors in the World War II. Thus, the references to the war can be found in 
most of the videos, but the context and connotation differ in different cases. For example, 
the speakers from the first Lugansk video, compared the situation in their city with the 
“horrors of the World War II”, which they believed would never happen again.154 This 
reference is rather neutral by itself and can be used just to describe with comparison the 
destruction the city has suffered because of the conflict, but in the context where the 
speakers blame Kiev for initiating the civil war in the East, such reference can be seen as 
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comparison of Ukrainian authorities with Nazi Germany. The reference goes even further in 
the video from Sevastopol. The speakers blame the Ukrainians for “betraying the ancestors, 
who sacrificed their lives in the Great Patriotic War”.155 
Although the Eastern Ukrainian students attempted to deconstruct some of the myths 
exposed in the Western Ukrainian videos, by doing this they nourished their own myths. For 
example, the students from Sevastopol referred to the myth that residents of the regions, 
which are under influence of the Russian media, are brainwashed. However, in their turn they 
emphasized that all the Ukrainian media are corrupted and serve for Ukrainian propaganda. 
They also claimed the Ukrainians to be under significant influence of the “oversea president”. 
This is a clear reference to the myth that the United States played a crucial role in plotting the 
Euromaidan protests, which has been constructed and distributed by the Russian media in 
order to emphasize the confrontation of Russia and the West. 
3.2.2. Language and terms 
The Western Ukrainian videos were distinguished with giving much symbolism to the events 
of Euromaidan as the key turn in the Ukraine’s path to the development, addressing the 
Crimea referendum as illegal and forced by Russia, and while having no clear terminology how 
to define the situation in the Eastern regions avoiding the notions of civil war and putting all 
blame for violence to Russia. The Eastern Ukrainian videos have the opposite characteristics.  
Thus, the ouster of president in Kiev during the Euromaidan is referred as “overthrow of 
legitimate power.” This matter has a complex structure, and there cannot be one objective 
opinion. On the one hand, actual president Yanukovych concerned with personal security and 
being afraid for his own life has left the county and could not fulfil his duty as the president 
of Ukraine. On the other hand, revolution cannot be legitimized, as it is not mentioned in the 
Ukrainian constitution, as it is not mentioned in constitutions of any other countries. Thus, 
the reference to the events in Kiev as illegal does not contradict the Constitution of Ukraine. 
However, this fact was somehow lacking in the Western Ukrainian videos. Still, the situation 
is quite complex, and different law experts express different opinions in this regard. 
Nevertheless, the speakers in the Eastern Ukrainian videos do not provide any expert 
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argumentation, but give an emotionally biased opinion. For example, the students from 
Crimean video refer to these events as “bloody coup”. If the Western Ukrainian students saw 
the Euromaidan as the “revolution of dignity”, which resulted in overthrow of a dictator, who 
led the country to total corruption, censored media and lawlessness of police, the Eastern 
Ukrainian students describe the results of the Euromaidan as “war, increase in crime, 
impoverishment of population, and sharp decrease of living standards.”  
Concerning the referendum in Crimea, all videos support a similar opinion, which contradicts 
to the description of “referendum with rifles” expressed in Western Ukrainian videos. Thus, 
the students from Sevastopol, who claim to participate in the referendum themselves, 
describe it as their “mutual voluntary and conscious choice” and argue that “the absolute 
majority of Crimean residents sincerely desired the historically just return of the Crimean 
peninsula to Russia”.156 The students from Crimea in their video message claim to eyewitness 
the “tears of joy” in the eyes of the Crimeans, who congratulated each other with “coming 
back home to Russia”.157 Although the role of Russia in the referendum is beyond doubt and 
considering the fact that the speakers in the video do not contest it, it is reasonable to suggest 
that the words of local citizens have more power than the opinion expressed in other parts of 
Ukraine. Thus, these messages can significantly contribute to the deconstruction of myths 
and provide a ground for a constructive dialogue. However, the “historical justice” of the 
return is doubtful and seems to be just another myth constructed during the conflict. 
In general, all Eastern Ukrainian videos tend to juxtapose the Crimean referendum with the 
“revolution of dignity” in Kiev. Besides the above mentioned negative economic 
consequences of the Euromaidan, the whole revolution is described as violent, leading to 
mass casualties and “crippled innocent citizens”, in comparison to “peaceful and freewill” 
referendum. Moreover, the results of the two “revolutions” are contraposed. If the Crimean 
referendum is argued to lead to “peace and tranquility”, the results of Euromaidan are long-
lasting protests. The “burning tires”, which served as a symbol of people’s uprising against 
corruption and their manifestation of dissatisfaction with the corrupted regime in the 
Western Ukrainian videos, had a negative connotation in the eyes of Eastern Ukrainians, and 
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were compared with symbolic “children playing in playgrounds” and “seniors spending 
evenings relaxing on benches” in Crimea.158  
The attitude towards the conflict in East of Ukraine expressed by the Eastern Ukrainian 
students also significantly differs from the opinions of their Western counterparts. All the 
blame for violence is put on the Kiev authorities. Thus, they are blamed for “drowning 
prosperous regions of Ukraine in blood and destroying tens of thousands innocent people” 
because “they had different opinion”. The conflict itself is referred no other than “civil war”. 
Both students from Lugansk and Donetsk said they had not wanted any war, while Kiev had 
brought war to them and called local people terrorists. The Ukrainian army is described as 
“punitive”, killing women, children and seniors. Moreover, if there were not any distinctive 
reference to the disputed regions in the Western Ukrainian videos, the Eastern students 
mentioned that Ukraine “had lost Crimea and Novorossiya”.  
3.2.3. Russia and Ukraine 
It seems that the symbols and myths, as well as the language and terminology, which were 
used in the Eastern Ukrainian videos, fully correspond with the ones common in Russian and, 
hence, inherent to the Russian identity. However, in reference to the Ukrainians, the position 
of the Eastern students is unique and distinctive.  
Still, some videos use neutral references while describing the relations between the Russian 
and Ukrainian nations. For example, the students from Sevastopol emphasize the “common 
history, common victories and common tragedies” of the two nations, and claim that the 
West is afraid of the “unity of two Slavic peoples”.159 Moreover, they end their video with the 
message that “the Ukrainians are still considered to be friends” to them, despite the latest 
events. Hence, they differentiate the two nations, although considering them to be close. 
Thus, the speakers in the video are the bearers of the clear Russian identity, and relate 
themselves only with Russia, not with Ukraine. Therefore, the residents of Crimea do not see 
themselves as Ukrainian, although such attitude was common even before the referendum.  
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However, the students from Lugansk and Donetsk have a different opinion. For example, the 
speakers from the first Lugansk video do not take either side and identify themselves with 
their region. They do not claim to be Russian nor Ukrainian, but emphasize their student 
identity. Hence, they seek to be politically indifferent, but criticize conflict and blame Kiev for 
destroying their city.  
The students from the Donetsk video also identify themselves with the student community. 
Although they do not express their clear relations with Ukraine, they neither identify 
themselves with Russia, nor emphasize any other distinctive identity. However, they argue 
that the Ukrainian nation has divided into “those who look towards the West and those who 
look towards the East”.160 Hence, their identity is mostly localized, but in close relation with 
Ukraine.  
A student from the second Lugansk video, who served in Ukrainian army before the conflict, 
says that the people from Donbass, Central Ukraine and Western Ukraine are one nation. He 
was surprised to be attacked by his own people, and decided to join the local military forces 
in order to protect his family and friends from Kiev aggression. Thus, he identifies himself as 
Ukrainian, and a participant of the civil war on the side of his local region.  
Thus, there is a distinctive difference between identifications in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. 
If the Crimeans see themselves as Russian, without emphasizing their residence, the Eastern 
Ukrainians consider themselves to be the bearers of Ukrainian identity, who are forced to 
protect their region from the Kiev aggression. Hence, the residents of Donetsk and Lugansk 
see the conflict as a civil war, which was initiated by Ukraine. They do not take any 
responsibility for the violence, and they do not mention Russia as being among the 
participants of the conflict.  
3.2.4. Proposals 
The aims expressed in the Eastern Ukrainian videos differ in every particular case, thus it is 
reasonable to mention all the suggestions.  
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The students of the first Lugansk video say that they have been trying to be politically 
indifferent, but concerned with the fact that their alleged opinions are expressed by different 
sides, they decided to vocalize their attitude towards the situation and deconstruct some 
myths. Thus, they described the gravity of life in a conflict area and their constant fear of the 
military actions. They claimed they did not want any war, but being put into this situation, 
they chose not to leave their home and decided to help each other to survive and bring peace 
to their city. Thus, their message is aimed to show their view of the situation, and they asked 
their Western Ukrainian counterparts to doubt the information they receive and to “check 
the truthiness of their own words”. 
The students of the Crimean video tried to deconstruct the myth expressed in the Western 
Ukrainian videos that the Crimean referendum was forced by Russia. Thus, they claimed to 
be the witnesses of the referendum and emphasized its peaceful and freewill nature. As a 
proposal, they asked the Ukrainians to visit Crimea in order to compare its peacefulness with 
unstable Ukraine.   
The invitation to visit their region was also articulated in the video second Lugansk video. 
However, the whole aim of the video message and the invitation was to prove the civil war 
nature of the conflict, as well as to show the destructions caused by the military actions 
conducted by the Ukrainian army. However, the true reasons of such invitations are unclear. 
It is well known that the Ukrainian government has issued the order, according to which it is 
not allowed to enter Crimea from the Russian territory, while the entrance from Ukraine is 
impossible due to the annexation by Russia. Similarly, it is not possible to enter the occupied 
regions of Donetsk and Lugansk, because of the military actions in the area. Thus, the 
invitations are meaningless and serve only as provocation. 
Although the students from Sevastopol throughout their video message blamed Kiev for 
rejection of all relations with Russia, escalation of military conflict and destructive course of 
the new Ukrainian government, they appealed to build a constructive dialogue in order to 
retain brotherly relations between the two nations. 
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The students from the Donetsk video criticized the antagonism caused by the conflict and 
asked not only their Ukrainian counterparts, but the international student community to be 
constructive and not destructive.  
3.2.5. Conclusion 
As it was initially assumed, the students from the Eastern Ukrainian videos did not represent 
one distinctive identity. Although in their messages they used similar references and 
expressed rather common opinions on particular events, the key messages significantly 
differed in the videos from the Eastern regions of Ukraine and in Crimea. 
Both regions used the recurring references to Ukraine’s and Russia’s common history with 
particular emphasis being put on the united actions of the Soviet army against the common 
enemy in the World War II. However, it was probably the only mentioning of the closeness 
between the two nations. 
The most unanimous opinion was expressed regarding Ukraine. Both regions sharply criticized 
the overthrow of the elected president during the “illegal” events of Euromaidan and accused 
the new government of initiating the civil war in Ukraine. For the residents of Donbass, the 
conflict was in the core of the message, as the military actions concerned them directly. 
Although they neither denied nor approved their adherence to Ukraine and their Ukrainian 
identity, the war was depicted as direct aggression of the Ukrainian government against their 
own people. The Western Ukrainians were blamed for bombing the peaceful cities and killing 
innocent civilians for having unfavorable opinion. Although, the students did not mention 
their distinction from their Western compatriots, the idea of them having “different opinion” 
implicated the unarticulated Eastern identity. Without having clearly understood their self-
identification, they used alternative identities in order to distinguish themselves from the rest 
of Ukraine, such as “student brotherhood”, or local identity, or the citizens of their regions 
and cities.  
For the residents of Crimea, the nature of the conflict in Donbass did not played the key role, 
as they referred to it only to highlight the atrocities of the Ukrainian army. In their case, the 
emphasis was put on the legitimacy of the Crimean referendum. They expressed unilateral 
satisfaction and relief with its results, and even referred to it as “historical justice”. Using such 
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notion implies their close adherence with the Russian identity. They did not express any 
relation with Ukraine, while Russia was mentioned as their native land despite the fact of 
Crimea being part of Ukraine for 60 years.  
3.3. Russian videos 
As the division of videos was made on the basis of their regional origin, all videos uploaded 
by students from Russia were included in the category “Russian videos”. We remember that 
in case with the videos included in the Western and Eastern Ukrainian categories, the main 
message was in certain extent common, whilst the speakers represented a common Western 
Ukrainian identity in the Western videos, some evolved version of the Eastern Ukrainian 
identity in the videos from Lugansk and Donetsk, and a typical Russian identity in Crimean 
videos. However, if 28 out of 30 Russian videos can be united in one category as similar, two 
remaining videos from Kaliningrad and Moscow are quite distinctive, although bearing 
opposite messages. Thus, the analysis of the Russian videos will be structured in a different 
way. Firstly, there will be the analysis of the video from Kaliningrad, which will be done in 
comparison with the second Kiev video. Then there will be a separate section for 28 Russian 
videos, which have a bunch of similarities with the Kaliningrad video, but have one significant 
distinction. One more separate part will be dedicated to the Moscow video, followed by the 
conclusion section. 
3.3.1. Kaliningrad video161 
The video from Kaliningrad was the first answer to the initial video from Kiev. The students 
carved out the key messages from the Ukrainian video and directly answered to them, 
expressing their opinion on the subject.  Thus, it will be interesting to see, how their 
interpretation of various events and ideas differs from the ones, expressed by Ukrainian 
students. 
First, the Ukrainian students say that “a war is going on” in their country, while Russian and 
Ukrainian soldiers, along with peaceful civilians are dying. Here the speakers imply the 
external nature of the conflict by putting the “Russian soldiers” prior to any other participants. 
This reflects the official Ukrainian state position, which defines the conflict as Ukraine 
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defending its territory and independence from the Russian aggression. The Russian students 
answer with the claim that the conflict is a “civil war”, whilst “regular Ukrainian citizens 
including children, elders and women are dying”. Thus, the answer does not mention any 
other participants in the conflict besides Ukrainian citizens. Such approach follows the Russian 
political discourse, which rejects any role of Russia in the conflict beside its support of local 
citizens with humanitarian aid. Moreover, by mentioning vulnerable groups of the population 
without explaining the reasons for violence, it implies the negative connotation to the whole 
situation, depicting Ukrainian government as producing violence with no cause.  
Second, the Ukrainian students say that the Russian and Ukrainian nations were united until 
the recent events. In their opinion, the division is caused by the constructed myths such as 
“fairytales about fascists, Ukrainian nationalists, right sector, and Banderites”, which act as 
“information noise”. The Russian students do not embrace the attempt to deconstruct certain 
myths, which are ubiquitously present in Russian media. Instead they bring up some facts, 
which do not deconstruct the above-mentioned myths, but provide new ground for 
demonizing Ukraine and fueling the hate. Among the facts were mentioned the victims of 
Euromaidan, the notorious events in Odessa, and bombing of Eastern Ukrainian cities. The 
data about the injured and killed people during the uprising on Euromaidan is proved and 
easily accessible. However, the versions on who is responsible for the violence differ in 
Ukrainian and Russian discourses. If Kiev accuse former president Yanukovych of using 
military forces to stop disorders, Moscow put the blame on anti-governmental activists for 
using home-made explosives against the police. At the same time, the Kaliningrad students 
emphasize the brotherly nature of the two nations, and claim that “nothing can tear their 
blood ties apart”, which in the context sounds more intimidating than uniting.  
Third, the Ukrainian students present the timeline with the cause-and-effect relationship of 
the events happened in Kiev in 2014. According to them, the rule of a dictator president led 
to “total corruption, unconditional rejection of European integration, censored media, and 
lawlessness of police”, which forced students to organize a “peaceful protest” action. The 
aggressive actions of the government were answered with countrywide uprising, which 
resulted in mass casualties. Hence, the “revolution of dignity” united Ukrainian people in their 
“fight for rights and freedoms”. The Russian students answered with their vision of the 
situation. The “peaceful protests” are described as “anti-constitutional coup”, a “dictator” as 
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“the president, elected by the Ukrainian people”, “total corruption” is compared with 
“thieves and criminals in the parliament” and an “oligarch” in power, the “revolution of 
dignity” resulted in “thousands of victims”, and “the united Ukrainians” fighting in a “civil 
war”. This part is a clear example how the same events can be seen contradictory by different 
actors. Although such juxtaposition of the facts and their interpretations looks like a typical 
axiological confrontation between antagonistic societies, it significantly contributes to a 
dialogue. 
Similar axiological confrontation takes place regarding the Crimean referendum. If the 
Ukrainian students describe the chain of events as “the autonomous republic Crimea, being 
a territory of independent Ukraine, fills up with Russian regular army and undertakes a 
referendum with rifles”, the Russian side refers to it as “democratic elections under 
protection of little green men”. The “protection” is justified with an attempt to prevent 
“bloody chaos”, which the Ukrainian government allegedly caused in Donbass. Several 
interesting aspects are mentioned by both sides. On the one hand, the students of both 
countries refer to the facts, which do not contradict to each other. Thus, for example, the 
Ukrainians emphasize legal adherence of Crimea to Ukraine, the fact, which is not mentioned, 
but either it is rejected by the Russians. At the same time, either part denies the presence of 
Russian military during the referendum. On the other hand, the interpretation of the events 
articulated by the students from Kaliningrad surprisingly differs from the official Russian 
discourse. The difference will be further elaborated in the next part, which will be dedicated 
to analysis of other Russian videos. 
While explaining the reasons for the sanctions, which were imposed by certain European 
countries and the USA, both parties tend to articulate with popular myths, constructed by 
their governments. Thus, the Ukrainian students first mention “world-wide conspiracy against 
great and sacred Russia”. The language is full of irony, but their own argument is as far from 
being reasonable as the one they are mocking. According to them, “Europe and America 
consider human life as the highest value”, hence the sanctions are motivated by the need to 
protect this value in Ukraine. Such explanation probably reflects the official European position 
on the sanctions announced on political level, but does it really cover the underlying reasons 
for them? However, the answer from the Russian students is beyond any official positions and 
belongs to the realm of speculations and bare populism. They claim that “Russia is the only 
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country fighting for democracy”, whilst the USA and Europe arrange revolutions and attack 
sovereign states, such as Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya. Although such exchange of opinions only 
fuel antagonism and fakes, it is still part of dialogue. 
Another unpredictable argument can be found in the end of both videos. There, the Ukrainian 
students argue that both countries are responsible for the conflict and they must be ashamed 
of such “common history”. Although by addressing the “common history”, the students do 
not refer to the Ukraine’s and Russia’s common past, but to the events where both countries 
participate, it still can be seen as an attempt to draw together two antagonistic societies. 
However, the Russian students tend to abstract from Ukrainian history. They say that “they 
will not be ashamed of THEIR history”, thus, they distance from the ideas about historical 
integrity and interdependence of the two countries, which are quite popular in Russian media.   
3.3.2. Newsfront and Moscow video 
After the video from Kaliningrad was released on the 1st of February 2015, information portal 
Newsfront launched an appeal in its social networks channels for students from other Russian 
universities to upload videos with their views on the situation. Newsfront was established on 
the 1st of March 2014, in Crimea. The claimed aim is close to those announced by Russia 
Today, which is to spread an “alternative truth” in different countries. Although, the official 
page states that it is financed only by donations and advertising revenues, a former employee 
claims a large part of the budget comes from the Russian secret service.  
It is not known what terms were offered to students for publishing videos and whether they 
were paid, but the appeal was answered with 28 different videos, which were published on 
the agency’s official Youtube channel during the period from the 5th to 10th of February 2015. 
Although the students speaking in front of their universities as well as the locations were 
different in all videos, the main message was suspiciously similar in all cases, and included 
certain theses, which will be analyzed hereafter. In general, it seems that the speakers were 
guided by a certain manual provided by Newsfront, and articulated what they were asked to, 
and not their own opinions.   
First, the students emphasize the close connection between Ukraine and Russia. The 
references to common history are used in most of the videos. A particular emphasis is put on 
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the period of World War II. The speakers subsequently mention the contribution the Soviet 
army consisting of both Russians and Ukrainians has made to the victory against a common 
enemy. Some students elaborate on this idea by claiming that the “Slavic world was always 
standing against the West throughout its history”. The repeating message invokes the 
Ukrainians to confront their government and to support the Russian direction of Ukraine’s 
foreign policy in order to sustain against the Western threats. The notion of the “Western 
threat” is a remarkable reference, which is used by the Russian media in order to explain the 
reasons for the sanctions for the Russian audience.   
Second, the Western countries, and especially the USA, are continually demonized by the 
speakers. Thus, America is accused of using propaganda in order to conduct information war 
and produce violence in Ukraine. The Euromaidan is described as a failure of Ukrainian 
people, which was organized and led by the American president. The antagonism between 
Russia and the USA, or sometimes the West in general, is the main motif in Russian political 
discourse. Without going deep into Russian political life, it is reasonable to mention that such 
ideological confrontation in the media had been essential during the Cold War, but lost its 
significance after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The return to it in the modern Russian 
media can be explained as an attempt to construct once again the image of the external threat 
and distract the population from internal problems caused by bad governance and sanctions. 
Since there is no point in constructing such image in Ukraine, it is reasonable to assume that 
the target audience of these video messages should be found not in Ukraine, but in Russia, 
and, perhaps, in Donbass.  
Concerning the conflict in Donbass, the students refer to it precisely as civil war. The Ukrainian 
authorities, which are depicted as illegal due to unconstitutional entering the office, are 
claimed to be responsible for initiating the war. The citizens of Donbass “have made their 
choice” and now suffer from the atrocities of Ukrainian army. The repeated message denies 
the presence of Russian army in Donbass, while the emphasis is put on humanitarian 
assistance provided by Russia. Since the official Ukrainian position regarding the conflict is 
clear and determined, whilst the Ukrainian population tend to support it, it is doubtful that 
the Newsfront targeted them in these video messages. However, the message regarding 
Donbass can appeal not only the Russians, but also the international audience.  
77 
 
As a reaction to such unilateral criticism of Ukraine, a group of students from the Moscow 
universities published their own video message on the 12th of February. First, they expressed 
gratitude for the efforts of Ukrainian students to start a dialogue and come over the 
information curtain. As a start of the reconciliation process they accepted the responsibility 
of their country for the conflict in Ukraine. They also criticized the aggressive policy 
undertaken by Moscow in Crimea and its support of the “undeclared criminal war” in the East 
of Ukraine. Thus, they expressed the alternative vision of the role of Russia in the conflict, 
which significantly differs not only from the other Russian videos, but also from the messages 
published by the Eastern Ukrainian students. Even though their video stands against 29 other 
videos from Russia with the opposite message, it is vital that they showed the presence of 
alternative opinions in Russia. Indeed, although it is difficult to estimate the share of those 
Russians who support the official Russian discourse and those who criticize it, the fact that 
the absolute majority of the Russian videos supported it, does not reflect the real number of 
followers, as it is easier to express the position of your government than to oppose it.  
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Conclusion 
Again, it is hardly possible to track how the exchange of video messages has contributed to 
the participants’ perception of each other, and how their self-identification has transformed 
through expressing their own opinions and listening to alternative ones. However, by listening 
to what they have to say, how they continually address background context and interpret 
facts and personalities based on their beliefs framed by political environment, it is possible to 
identify the key disagreements in the conflict. The special relationship between thinking and 
speaking is the central part of successful dialogue. Addressing seemingly same matters leads 
to a deeper understanding between opponents. A dialogue, no matter how constructive it is, 
provides potential to break the boundaries of misunderstanding and misinterpretation 
between antagonistic societies, which contributes to conflict transformation. 
Within the framework of conflict transformation dialogue, being the necessary link from 
antagonism to agonism, is mainly aimed at deconstruction of enemy images and narrative 
and construction of shared meanings and narratives. When dialogue is conducted as an act 
of sharing, it contributes to changing the vision of the other as the enemy. The aim of dialogue 
is not to find who is right and who is wrong or whose interpretation of the truth has more 
right to exist, but to discover that interpretations and opinions might be different, but equally 
essential and valuable. 
Although, the initial target of the Western Ukrainian videos was the students from Russia, the 
response of the Eastern Ukrainian students and of the students from Crimea played a crucial 
role in exchange of opinions. Thus, the resulted dialogue shaped into an exchange of tree 
distinctive discourses. In order to draw the line, it is important to look at how all three sides 
expressed their attitudes towards such key points in the Russia-Ukraine conflict as the events 
of Euromaidan, the common historical past of the two countries, in particular the times of the 
World War II, the referendum in Crimea, and the nature of the conflict in the East of Ukraine, 
as well as what was the expressed self-identification of the speakers. 
The events of Euromaidan had a crucial symbolic meaning for the Western Ukrainians. They 
saw it as a unique example of unification of the Ukrainian nation in their struggle for a better 
future of their country. The use of violence, mass destructions and casualties during the 
uprising were unanimously justified by the right cause as the necessary small evil against the 
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bigger threat of a corrupted president. However, both Eastern Ukrainians and Russians 
expressed an alternative attitude towards the events. Remarkably, the Eastern Ukrainians 
chose not to join the excitement of their compatriots in regard of “the revolution of dignity”. 
The overthrow of the president was criticized as illegal, whilst the mass casualties of the 
uprising were put in blame on the new Ukrainian government with partial share of 
responsibility on the alleged Western interveners.   
Surprisingly, despite the efforts of the Ukrainian government to construct new national 
symbols out of the nationalist movement of collaborators with Nazi Germany against the 
Soviet regime during the World War II, even the Western Ukrainians, who are often referred 
to as the most pro-nationalist part of the Ukrainian population, did not expressed any support 
for such initiatives. They repeatedly articulated in favor of the positive experience of the joint 
efforts of all Soviet people against the external threat and emphasized the importance of 
commemoration of their achievements. Thus, the myths of Banderites and nationalists, which 
were continuously highlighted in the Russian video messages, did not find any proofs in the 
words of the Western Ukrainian students. Since the memory of the Great War has the crucial 
significance in the eyes of the Russians, the opinion shared with the Ukrainians can be one of 
the common points for development of a dialogue. 
Although the position of the Western Ukrainians towards the referendum in Crimea was 
opposite to the one expressed by both Russian and Eastern Ukrainian students, the attitude 
towards the local Crimean citizens were not defined by the Ukrainian side. They repeatedly 
emphasized the illegal status of the referendum, but chose not to comment on the opinions 
of the Crimeans and possible solutions for the situation in the region. Since two videos, which 
participated in the video dialogue, were published directly from Crimea, the expression of 
their motifs and opinions might contribute to a deeper understanding of the situation. Since 
the videos from Crimea were published later than the messages from Western Ukraine, it is 
impossible to track how effective they were for clarification of the situation, but the 
assumption is that if the initial declared aims of the Ukrainian students were to fill the gaps 
in the whole picture of the conflict, the messages from Crimea might serve for that purpose. 
However, the question remains, how willing were the Ukrainian students to actually hear the 
alternative opinions and how open-minded they were to accept the opinion, which stays in 
contrast with their own. 
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Concerning the conflict in Donbass, the participants of the video dialogue expressed three 
distinctive opinions. The Western Ukrainian students defined the conflict as an undeclared 
war between Russia and Ukraine with Russia regarded as the aggressor. The local citizens of 
the region are not seen as the direct participants, although they are described as victims. The 
Russian students denied any involvement of their country in the conflict and put all the blame 
for the violence on aggressive Ukrainian government, who used military force against their 
own people. The residents of Donbass defined the conflict as a civil war, where Ukraine is 
depicted as the aggressor, and the locals as the defending side. Remarkably, neither side 
chose to articulate their opinion about the reasons of the conflict. The Ukrainians explained 
the reasons with spontaneous act of Russian aggression guided by its imperial ambitions. The 
Russians and Eastern Ukrainians articulated similar spontaneous act of Kiev aggression 
against their own people. Thus, since both sides chose not to seek the root reasons of the 
conflict and expressed just the emotionally framed accusations, this might be a key topic of 
the further dialogue. 
Thus, the ideas and opinions expressed by all participants of the video dialogue were not fully 
contradicting. Certain topics proved to stand on the common ground. For example, the 
significance of the World War II is unilaterally emphasized, whilst all parties see the citizens 
of Donbass as the victims of the military conflict. Moreover, there were the positions 
concerning certain other topics, which were not the same, but did not show radical 
disagreement.  For example, the situation in Crimea emphasized the opposite attitudes 
towards the status of the referendum, but showed the potential to become the necessary 
topic for exchange of opinions, probably for finding some solution. However, quite many 
topics proved to be the core of misunderstanding and disagreement. For example, the 
attitudes towards the Euromaidan or the nature and the participants of the conflict differ 
significantly and cannot be easily changed. 
In conclusion, it is important to say that within constructed realities, it is crucial to build a 
dialogue between two warring societies not to decide whose story is more truthful, but at 
least to let the parties express different views, experiences and narratives. The narratives of 
the past often represent the ‘other’ as a threat. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is fueled with 
discourses of historical enmity, hatred and polarization. Both sides of the conflict promote 
aggressive antagonistic narratives and actively use historical myths and propaganda as the 
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tools of a new hybrid warfare. Typical instrument in such type of war is creating a new reality, 
where it is hardly possible to know the truth. The whole notion of the truth disappears in the 
often-contradictory media reports from both warring parties, while the observers, not having 
the direct access to the battleground, can only repeat and multiply the information provided 
by the propaganda machine. In this case, the video dialogue, although cannot be the solution 
to the conflict, can contribute to deeper understanding of the alternative opinions and to 
reduction of antagonism between the participants of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. 
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Annex 1. Table of Videos 
Country City Date Link Against 
Russia 
Against 
Ukraine 
General 
positive 
Main ideas 
W
es
te
rn
 U
kr
ai
ne
 
1. Kiev 1 2014.03.11 https://www.youtu
be.com/watch?v=
9QxvN0jUfa0  
--/+ - +/- 
Brotherly nations. Need peace. Crimea is Ukrainian, 
leave it alone. Ukraine is integral. Quotation from 
Taras Shevchenko. 
2. Kiev 2 2015.01.27 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=mPB-sZ4sVss  + - - 
Check information in media. Russians and Ukrainians 
different. Euromaidan is good. Russian aggression in 
Crimea. West is good. Russia is responsible for 
violence. 
3. Lvov 1 2015.02.01 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=XCi6Q3aLRfs +/- - -/+ 
Myths about Western Ukraine are not truthful. 
Russian is not oppressed, no hate. Different nations, 
but close. Russians believe in propaganda and 
produce hate. Need deconstruct myths. 
4. Ivano-
Frankovsk 
2015.02.10 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=7uCK73eU--Q 
+ - - 
As poem. Russia is responsible for war. Russians 
produce violence and propaganda. Don’t trust 
propaganda. Leave Ukraine alone. 
5. Khmelnitsk
i 
2015.02.11 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=Gttk2IHHVYI 
- - + 
Stop aggression and negative discourse. Don’t trust 
media. Somebody tries to provoke conflict. Be 
peaceful. 
6. Lvov 2 2015.02.19 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=uErfihm_ZMc 
- - + 
Answer to Moscow. Gratitude for bravery. Break 
hate with God’s help. 
7. Vinnitsa 2015.02.26 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=NIyZGffzPAk 
- - + 
Need peaceful relations beyond politics. Ukrainians 
are united because of (civil?) war. Russian media are 
provocative. Build direct dialogue to exchange views. 
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Ru
ss
ia
 
                             
1. Kaliningra
d 
2015.02.01 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=Zn69mAzPwjg 
- + - 
Direct answer to Kiev 1. Media is truthful. Violence in 
Ukraine. Euromaidan illegal. Crimea in peace. West is 
aggressor. Ukraine is responsible for violence. 
2. Irkutsk 2015.02.05 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=SL6t68mdezY 
- --/+ - 
Brotherly nations. Don’t trust western information. 
America produce information war and violence. 
Must be united, because one nation. 
3. Yekaterinb
urg 
2015.02.05 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=iGLYxz2hxi4 
- - +/- 
Western propaganda. Civil war. Slavic world against 
west throughout history. 
4. Krasnodar 2015.02.06 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=aOCThsAX0p8 
- ++/- - 
Euromaidan is failure and was led by America. Nazi 
are national hero. Ukrainian authorities are illegal. 
Donbass made a choice. 
5. Voronezh 2015.02.06 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=CwTZ57jwz_g - + - 
Ukrainian authorities are responsible for war. Russia 
participates with humanitarian help. Crimea is legal. 
Common history, brotherly nations. Western 
propaganda. 
6. Tumen 2015.02.06 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=4OfMrn47deg 
- + - 
Civil war. Ukrainian authorities are responsible for 
war. No Russian army in Donbass. Crimea is legal. 
Ukraine must choose Russia. 
7. Taganrog 2015.02.06 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=uunibsM-5OQ - + - 
Refugees from Donbass suffer from Ukrainian army. 
Ukrainian authorities are responsible for war. No 
Russian army in Donbass. Crimea is legal. America 
produce information war and violence. Brotherly 
nations. Ukraine must choose Russia. 
8. Omsk 2015.02.06 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=owdfm3iCo90 - + - 
Brotherly nations. Common history. America 
produce information war and violence. Ukrainian 
authorities are responsible for war. Ukraine must 
choose Russia. No Russian army in Donbass. Crimea 
is legal. Donbass made a choice. 
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9. Arkhangels
k 
2015.02.06 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=vrOpbmnpYe0 - + - 
Common history. No Russian army in Donbass. 
Crimea is legal. Ukrainian authorities are responsible 
for war. Donbass made a choice. Ukraine must 
choose Russia. 
10. Bryansk 2015.02.06 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=wkBYKGEyGns 
- + -/+ 
Brotherly nations. Common history. Immigrant from 
Ukraine says his country got worse. 
11. Smole
nsk 
2015.02.06 https://www.youtu
be.com/watch?v=
uX3sk_nUTDM  
- + - 
Brotherly nations. Ukrainian authorities are 
responsible for war. Crimea is legal (witness).  
12. Altai 2015.02.06 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=yHBSocxLVNc - + - 
Civil war. Ukrainian authorities are responsible for 
war. No Russian army in Donbass. Crimea is legal. 
America produce information war and violence. 
Common history. 
13. Oryol 2015.02.06 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=Eb9hRZh-2FQ - + - 
Brotherly nations. No Russian army in Donbass. 
America produce information war and violence. 
Donbass made a choice. Ukrainian authorities are 
responsible for war. Common history. 
14. Dagestan 2015.02.06 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=DSWm2okNQQ
M 
- + - 
Common history. America produce information war 
and violence. Brotherly nations. Ukraine must 
choose Russia. 
15. Vladimir 2015.02.06 https://www.youtu
be.com/watch?v=
HSvFE2_0k9I  - + - 
Common history. Ukrainian authorities are 
responsible for war. America produce information 
war and violence. Brotherly nations. Ukraine must 
choose Russia. 
16. Cherkess
k 
2015.02.06 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=WOPosHTayPk - + - 
Answer to Kiev 1. Brotherly nations. Common 
history. America produce information war and 
violence. Common history. Ukraine must choose 
Russia. 
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17. Kursk 2015.02.06 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=9mp9jSBgbx4 
- - +/- 
Common history. Humanitarian aid. America 
produce information war and violence. 
18. Saratov 2015.02.06 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=NHrU9T5vgNE 
- + - 
Answer to Kiev 1. Videos of conflict victims. Ukrainian 
authorities are responsible for war. Common history. 
19. Ulianovsk 2015.02.07 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=g8Aqe1w32kI 
- + - 
Common history. America produce information war 
and violence. Brotherly nations. 
20. Chelyabi
nsk 
2015.02.07 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=nXHQwa3xeN4 - + - 
Common history. No Russian army in Donbass. 
Crimea is legal. Donbass made a choice. America 
produce information war and violence. Ukraine must 
choose Russia. Brotherly nations. 
21. S-
Petersburg 
2015.02.07 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=Px1FgNpRs2w - + - 
America produce information war and violence. 
Ukrainian authorities are responsible for war. 
Common history. Brotherly nations. No Russian army 
in Donbass. Crimea is legal. 
22. Nizhnii 
Novgorog 
2015.02.07 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=Vb8vwB9dKNg 
- - + 
Brotherly nations.  
23. Khabarov
sk 
2015.02.08 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=dtQbEpyFwI4 
- + - 
Common history. Ukrainian authorities are 
responsible for war. 
24. Istra 2015.02.08 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=S8BL0BOHj2s 
- + - 
No Russian army in Donbass. Crimea is legal. America 
produce information war and violence. Brotherly 
nations. Common history. 
25. Kazan 2015.02.08 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=WQ6VR3oJHII 
- + - 
Common history. Ukrainian authorities are 
responsible for war. Brotherly nations. Ukraine must 
choose Russia. 
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26. Moscow 
2 
2015.02.09 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=dEn_abE829Y - + - 
Direct answer to Kiev 1. Media not truthful, but 
refugees from Ukraine are witnesses. Ukraine is 
responsible for violence. Crimea is peaceful. 
Ukrainian media and authorities are lying. Ukraine is 
in crisis and responsible for it. Doublecheck Ukrainian 
media. 
27. Yaroslavl 2015.02.09 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=QvRNJ_OYFqk 
- + - 
Common history. Ukrainian media and authorities 
are lying. 
28. Lipetsk 2015.02.09 https://www.youtu
be.com/watch?v=I
2HhEPLlCHg  
- + - 
Common history. Brotherly nations. No Russian army 
in Donbass. Crimea is legal. Ukrainian authorities are 
responsible for war. 
29. Belgorod 2015.02.10 https://www.youtu
be.com/watch?v=
MpA1mniLfM0  
- + + 
Common history. Ukrainian media and authorities 
are lying. 
30. Moscow 
1 
2015.02.12 https://www.youtu
be.com/watch?v=
VklUdwiiuGE + - - 
Answer to Kiev 1. Apologies for Russian aggression. 
Russia is responsible for war, Crimea illegal. Media 
are provocative, must not trust. Need to stop war 
together. 
Ea
st
er
n 
Uk
ra
in
e 1. Lugansk 1 2015.02.03 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=JzF3HBKuejc 
- - + 
Saying truth. Want peace. Ukrainian media and 
authorities are lying. 
2. Crimea 2015.02.05 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=GqYazJazbWY 
- + - 
Crimea is legal. Ukrainian media and authorities are 
lying. Crimea is peaceful, Ukraine is at war. 
3. Sevastopol 2015.02.07 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=xxLuS1Seht4 
- + - 
Crimea is legal. Ukrainian authorities are responsible 
for war. Ukrainian media and authorities are lying. 
Brotherly nations. 
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4. Lugansk 2 2015.02.09 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=j2RdWSFhJ9I 
- + - 
Ukrainian authorities are responsible for war. Civil 
war. One nation in Ukraine.  
5. Donetsk 2015.02.15 https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=cMD-wouC2AQ 
- - + 
Support both Ukrainians and Russians. Need to 
discuss what’s happening. Don’t build hate, think of 
future. 
 
 
